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Abstract: New firms face challenging financing markets due to their liabilities of newness 
(Stinchcombe & March, 1965).  As a result, entrepreneurs must seek out alternative 
financing avenues (Berger & Udell, 1998) and surrender equity to investors to receive 
funds needed for growth. Entrepreneurs use the business pitch as their primary tool to 
present their value proposition to investors through a combination of storytelling and 
sensegiving (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). The content of a business pitch can be crafted 
in a way that delivers a favorable impression of the opportunity and the entrepreneurial 
team (Pollack et al., 2012). What has not been investigated is whether signals sent 
through the business pitch can improve an entrepreneur’s negotiating position.  This 
analysis builds on prior research relating to entrepreneurial pitching behaviors and 
decision making (Thompson, 2014; Ellsberg, 1961) by focusing on the unexplored 
relationship between an entrepreneur's signals and deal structure.  At the stage of a 
business pitch, the entrepreneur must selectively communicate information (in a finite 
amount of time) about themselves and the opportunity as there is asymmetric information 
about the opportunity (signaling theory) in a way that makes their opportunity attractive 
to investors, potentially creating more than one investor alternative for the entrepreneur 
to select reducing dependency on a single investor and their proposed deal terms (power-
dependence theory).  The determinants of venture quality (human capital, social capital, 
intellectual capital, and financial capital) were theorized to increase the quantity of 
investor alternatives, and subsequently improve the negotiating position of the 
entrepreneur.  In addition, the relationship between high venture quality signals and the 
number of investor alternatives was theorized to be moderated by the signal 
characteristics of cost and honesty.  Though support was not found for these hypotheses 
based on the selected dataset used in the empirical portion of the study, qualitative 
responses obtained by entrepreneurs and limitations that came to light when analyzing the 
dataset create the need for further research on the topic.  The computer-aided text 
analysis linguistic dictionaries and framework established for this investigation provide a 
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Businesses need resources to grow and entrepreneurs are typically constrained by the lack 
of resources at both the start-up and growth stages of a company’s life cycle.  Due to this 
deficiency, entrepreneurs look for funding from banks, potential investors, or even 
acquirers to allow for the next stage of growth.  On average, firms with greater resources 
increase their odds of growth and survival (Singh, Ang, & Leong, 2003) and insufficient 
funding leads to lower performance levels (Rutherford, 2015). 
Debt financing from banks provides an avenue for business owners to repay loans 
with interest without having to give up equity or ownership control.  However, new firms 
face challenging financing markets due to their lack of company financial history (Berger 
& Udel, 1998).  Loans to start-ups are viewed as high risk as their “liability of newness” 
qualities result in a higher mortality rate when compared to older firms (Stinchcombe & 
March, 1965).  Banks are generally risk adverse.  The unwillingness of traditional banks 
to lend to start-ups creates a “funding gap” as entrepreneurs are not able to obtain capital 
from their preferred sources (Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 2009).  Because of the funding 
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gap, entrepreneurs must seek out alternative financing avenues which involve giving up 
equity to angel investors to receive funds needed for growth.  In the United States in 2017, it 
is estimated that angel/seed and early stage venture capital investments accounted for more 
than 77,750 investment deals at a funding amount of over $94.1 billion (Angel Capital 
Association, 2018; National Venture Capital Association, 2018).  “Since there is no share 
price for units of new ventures, terms of equity investments or ‘deals’ are typically decided 
by negotiations between the entrepreneur and the investor” (Rutherford, 2015, p. 29).  While 
entrepreneurs seek equity needed for their desired growth, it comes at a cost.  The cost is the 
percentage of equity in the company that an entrepreneur must offer to receive the desired 
funding.  It is the perceived desirability of the opportunity in the eyes of the investor that will 
potentially alter the percentage of equity that the investor will accept for a given investment 
amount. 
Statement of Purpose 
Entrepreneurs use the business pitch as their primary tool to present their value 
proposition to investors through a combination of storytelling and sensegiving (Lounsbury & 
Glynn, 2001). Indeed, the content of a business pitch can be crafted in a way that delivers a 
favorable impression of the opportunity and the entrepreneurial team (Pollack, Rutherford, 
and Nagy, 2012).  If entrepreneurs understand the signals that strengthen their leverage in an 
equity financing negotiation, then entrepreneurs may be able to attract the desired amount of 
growth capital while minimizing the amount of equity needed to complete the transaction 




Problem Statement and Research Questions 
What has not been investigated, though, is whether signals sent through the business 
pitch can improve an entrepreneur’s negotiating position.  The purpose of this dissertation is 
to address the following broad question: 
In the context of the pitch, what signals can an entrepreneur send to attain a more 
powerful negotiating position and better financing deal terms? 
Three specific research questions to be explored regarding communicated signals from a 
business pitch and their relationship to the negotiation are:  
(1) During an investment pitch, do signals of high venture quality as a result of 
human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and/or financial capital affect the 
number of investor alternatives of a new venture? 
(2) In addition, how do the characteristics of cost and honesty of the signal capital 
types affect the number of investor alternatives? 
(3) Does the number of investor alternatives as a result of the signals affect the deal 
terms that are negotiated between the entrepreneur and investor? 
Contributions of the Study 
There are four main contributions of this research.  First, this analysis builds on prior 
research relating to entrepreneurial pitching behaviors and decision making (Thompson, 
2014; Ellsberg, 1961) by focusing on the previously unexplored relationship between an 
entrepreneur's signals and deal structure.  As such, this study focuses on the attributes of 
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venture quality (human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and financial capital) and 
the corresponding signals sent to potential investors. 
Second, power-dependency theory is introduced to explain how alternatives may be 
created through signaling, thus expanding both the literature in new venture finance and 
negotiations.  At the stage of a business pitch, the entrepreneur must selectively communicate 
information (in a finite amount of time) about themselves and the opportunity as there is 
asymmetric information about the opportunity (signaling theory) in a way that makes their 
opportunity attractive to investors, potentially creating more than one investor alternative for 
the entrepreneur to select reducing dependency on a single investor and their proposed deal 
terms (power-dependence theory).  As we currently do not know much about the 
nomological net of alternatives - what precedes them and what follows them - this study 
intends to provide insight.  Building on the work of Akerlof (1970) of information 
asymmetry relating to quality and uncertainty, I theorize that the determinants of venture 
quality (human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and financial capital) will increase 
the quantity of alternatives.  Subsequently, I theorize that this will improve the negotiating 
position of the entrepreneur.  For this study, it is important to note that possessing a quality 
and signaling a quality would be not be viewed as one in the same.  This study focuses on the 
capital (qualities) being communicated to investors and not those that a company may 
possess but are not communicated.  This study looks at how these communicated messages 
lead to more (or less) alternatives for the entrepreneur. 
Third, both negotiation and entrepreneurship literature is enriched as this study 
analyzes real world data, not experimental data where related limitations exist.  As both the 
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entrepreneurs and investors have real money at stake in the negotiation, this study allows for 
the evaluation of outcomes related to alternatives between two parties in a negotiation. 
Finally, as a secondary value-added benefit, the analysis may provide insight that 
entrepreneurs can use on how to effectively pitch their business opportunities to investors.  
With this research, an entrepreneur would be able to make a conscious decision on what 
attributes to highlight and emphasize to equity investors that would increase alternatives and 
ultimately improve the deal terms that they receive.  By strengthening their leverage in equity 
financing negotiations, entrepreneurs can attract the desired amount of growth capital while 
minimizing the amount of equity needed to complete their financing transactions. 
Through the use of signals, entrepreneurs have the ability to reduce the information 
asymmetry that exists between the new venture and investors.  The lack of clarity related to 
an opportunity’s quality and level of uncertainty contribute to an investor’s perception of risk 
in the investment.  Signals are a powerful way to communicate messages and entrepreneurs 
can inform potential investors about characteristics of their opportunity that were otherwise 
unknown (Pollack et al., 2012).  As previously mentioned, each equity financing transaction 
is a negotiation between an entrepreneur and investor.  Signaling is one way for 
entrepreneurs to reduce information asymmetry and transmit positive characteristics to 
potential financiers.  Rutherford, Pollack, Mazzei, and Sanchez-Ruiz (2017, p. 691) ask the 
question, “What are the signals that entrepreneurs can send to their most critical, earliest 
stakeholders that are both costly and honest?”  This study intends to answer this critical 
question providing an understanding of what signals increase the perception of venture 
quality or increase the level of confidence and lead to a more powerful negotiating position 




This proposal is structured as follows: Chapter II includes a thorough review of 
signaling theory.  I provide an overview of the signaling environment covering the 
components of senders, signals, receivers, and feedback.  The quality of signals are covered 
in greater detail discussing how they are observable, costly, honest, consistent, and frequent.  
I then discuss how signals have been used throughout history providing a few examples from 
the anthropology domain as well as touch on signal use in other disciplines.  I then go in 
greater detail to explain how new ventures use signals when pursuing investment.  Building 
on the work of Akerlof (1970) of information asymmetry relating to the determinants of 
quality and uncertainty and Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, and Schweizer (2015) work which 
look at these factors at a more granular level related to early stage companies (in a similar, 
but different context), I create a theoretical model of venture quality and level of confidence 
leading to investment alternatives.  Human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and 
financial capital signals are covered to explain how they relate to venture quality signals.  
The delivery method of new venture signals in my study, the entrepreneur’s business pitch, is 
then explained.  As each equity financing transaction has deal terms negotiated 
independently, I then explain related topics of negotiations.  Two central components of 
negotiations are discussed, power and the best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA).  Negotiation dynamics are discussed with a deep explanation of fear of missing out 
(FoMO) as it relates to supply and demand being an influential component of the negotiation.  
In addition, the topics of operating and negotiation positions are explained as they are 
components of the theoretical model (see Figure 1).  This includes a discussion of 
organizational life cycles and deal structure (valuation terms).  I conclude Chapter II by 
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presenting my theoretical rationale and hypotheses for my research model.  In Chapter III, I 
discuss the proposed methodology for my research study.  This includes a discussion about 
my proposed method of analysis and data sources.  Chapter IV includes a detailed outline of 
how the computer-aided text analysis dictionaries were created along with steps of data 
preparation for the analysis.  Descriptive statistics results of the regression analysis are 
displayed and discussed.  The results of both the moderation and mediation hypotheses are 
also included in this section.  Finally, Chapter V discusses the results of each of the research 
questions.  The external validity of the theory was tested by gaining insight directly from 
entrepreneurs through an open-ended question survey.  A discussion of the responses is 
included.  Implications related to entrepreneurship research, negotiation research, and 
practitioners is covered.  The chapter concludes with a discussion on study limitations and 
thoughts for future research directions. 
 






LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this dissertation, the bases of signaling theory and power-dependence theory 
are married to offer a model of pitch negotiation.  Signaling theory describes the process 
in which a sender directs a deliberate message to a receiver as a way of reducing 
information asymmetry between the sender and the recipient (Spence, 1973).  Signaling 
appropriately can affect the value of the firm through reducing information asymmetries 
(Levy & Lazarovich-Porat, 1995), thus ultimately improving deal terms for the 
entrepreneur.  Akerlof (1970) explains that information asymmetry relates to quality and 
uncertainty.  This study builds a framework around Akerlof's quality and uncertainty 
determinants to evaluate signals that new firms can send to reduce information 
asymmetry. 
Emerson’s power-dependence theory (1962) explains that negotiation outcomes 
are related to the degree that each negotiator is dependent upon the other.  High 
dependency on the opposition leads to high opposition power in negotiations.  If 
alternatives to a negotiated deal lead a negotiator to be less dependent on the opposition, 
the power of the opposition diminishes.  Building upon this logic, the best alternative to a  
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negotiated agreement (BATNA) construct was introduced by Fisher and Ury in their 
1981 book titled Getting to Yes.  “A minimally necessary condition for an agreement to 
be mutually acceptable is that each side prefers the deal to its BATNA” (Sebenius, 2017, 
p. 90).  Outcomes in a negotiation are affected by the differential power that exists 
between negotiators (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994).  However, for a negotiator to 
possess power, one must have quality alternatives.  Quality alternatives provide a 
negotiator with the ability to walk away from a negotiation knowing that a deal can be 
made on better terms than the current negotiation.  The higher the quality of the 
alternatives, the more power that a negotiator possesses as the need to negotiate off of a 
current position lessens.  However, for a negotiator to obtain this power, one must create 
quality alternatives.  Quality alternatives are influential in getting the opposition to alter 
valuation of the subject of the negotiation (Pinkley, 1995). 
As the capital markets show, risk and expected return are highly correlated.  If an 
investor takes on more risk, they rightfully want to be rewarded for the potential loss in 
investment.  As the risk of loss decreases, the reward also decreases as additional 
investors become willing to take on the lowered risk. 
In new venture finance, entrepreneurs are faced with challenges due to their 
liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe & March, 1965).  These liabilities of newness create 
an uncertainty pertaining to the new firm's ability to consistently pay off debt if granted.  
Entrepreneurs must seek out alternative financing which often involves giving up equity 
to angel investors to receive capital needed for growth.  Knowing that an entrepreneur's 
firm is handicapped in regards to the type of financing that it could attain, equity 
investors (angel/seed investors and venture capitalists) recognize that there is an 
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imbalance of power.  In the case of new venture finance, early stage investors have the 
ability to dictate investment deal terms often negotiating larger equity positions in return 
for their cash injection into the company.  Because these alternative fanciers understand 
their negotiation leverage, in that entrepreneurs need cash but have limited financing 
options, they are often viewed as taking advantage of the situation and are referred to as 
“vulture capitalists” by entrepreneurs (Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989). 
 The liability of newness often deters debt financiers, providing equity investors 
leverage as an entrepreneur's options for financing have been decreased.  The uncertainty 
behind a new venture creates an unease in loaning money to the business.  Information 
asymmetry causes high quality business opportunities to be mixed with low quality 
business opportunities, and financiers have difficulty distinguishing between the two 
(Akerlof, 1970).  Whereas an existing firm has documented financial performance 
records and many observable characteristics (e.g. current or past customers) that can 
verify legitimacy, new ventures lack verifiable information.    While there may be quality 
attributes of the new venture, these attributes are only known by those within the 
organization (i.e. information asymmetry).  Thus, when negotiating, the outsiders are the 
potential investors with the negotiation leverage. 
 Entrepreneurs can decrease uncertainty by communicating attributes about the 
firm.  Through the use of signals, entrepreneurs can send messages about the company's 
potential future success.  Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) explains how information 
asymmetry can be reduced through deliberate messages sent by an entrepreneur to 
potential investors.  However, not all attributes carry the same weight.  Signals that are 
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costly and more difficult to manipulate are often viewed as stronger indicators of truthful 
information being sent. 
 In this chapter, I further elaborate on the characteristics of and the specific types 
of signals that new ventures can send to investors.  I also provide an understanding of the 
signaling environment and delivery mechanism—the business pitch—which 
entrepreneurs use to convey these signals.  I also further explain how alternatives drive 
power within the negotiation developing hypotheses related to how these alternatives lead 
to improved deal terms for entrepreneurs. 
The Origins of Signaling 
Signaling origins root back to evolutionary biology (e.g. Darwin, 1888; Zahavi & 
Zahavi, 1999) and anthropology (e.g. Darwin, 1888; Bird & Smith, 2005) with biologists 
and anthropologists agreeing that signals must be both costly and honest.  Evolutionary 
biology helps explains how signals play an important role in survival and the expansion 
of species.  Costly signals are ones that are difficult to imitate by those of lower quality.  
Peacocks dragging around large tails or deer carrying around large antlers are both 
examples of handicaps to the signalers, but their cost (in the way of producing them or 
exhibiting them) provide a way of distinguishing themselves from lower quality peers 
(Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999).  These displays of large, beautiful feathers or expansive racks, 
provide signals to opposing sexes as potential mates (Darwin, 1888; Bird & Smith, 2005).  
“Signal cost (actual or potential) can serve as a powerful means of guaranteeing honesty 
and thus allow observers to gauge the relevant hidden qualities of potential allies, mates, 
or competitors” (Bird & Smith, 2005, p. 223) while “those who exaggerate their abilities 
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or accomplishments (signal a higher quality than they actually possess) will be punished 
(pay a disproportionate consequence cost) if their exaggerations are discovered” (Bird & 
Smith, 2005, p. 236).  A costly signal for a gazelle, for example, is its behavior when 
confronted with a predator. Thomson’s gazelles spring into the air lifting all four legs 
from the ground when a predator is seen, a behavior known as stotting. Prior to this leap, 
the predator suspects an unsuspecting prey that can easily be caught. However, once the 
gazelle becomes aware of the predator, their stotting behavior signals alertness and the 
athleticism to elude capture. Though this energy exertion comes as a cost to the gazelle, 
the signal is powerful enough for the predator to have second thoughts about the prey and 
call off the chase (Cronk, 2005; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999). 
Signals have played an important role across the development of human cultures 
and societies.  “Culture is part of the milieu that determines the design, intensity, and use 
of signals” (Soler, Batiste, & Cronk, 2014).  Anthropologists have examined 
ethnographic evidence to understand how signals communicate unobserved attributes.  
For example, the Melanesian society of Meriam Islanders were known to have elaborate 
celebrations following the death of a member of their clan.  Public ceremonies and feasts 
were common with the display of food and gifts.  The quality and quantity of the food 
distributed was a signal of the feast giver’s strength in allies as others would contribute to 
the festivities.  These redistributive feasts signal the strength and size of the alliance 
group.  Two classes would typically attend such events, best described as inner and outer 
circles.  Those in the inner circle, family members and close ties, receive gifts in addition 
to the feast food, while the outer circle are recipients of just feast food.  For those in the 
inner circle, their social signal provides “enhanced political power and marriage-market 
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status” (Bird & Smith, p. 237).  While the inner circle had these signaling qualities, 
outsiders received the signal and used this information as a way of deciding who to ally 
with or marry (Bird & Smith, 2005). 
 Anthropologists have also examined signals given off by individuals which 
signify superiority.  In many Melanesian societies, the gardening skills of a man was a 
signaling method to others through the display of big-yams.  “Big-yam men become 
high-status political entrepreneurs, using their trade contacts to thwart their rivals and 
pursue their political ambitions” (Bird & Smith, 2005, p. 229).  Skill and knowledge were 
perceived as being the antecedents of the largest and best yams.  Similar to today’s 
society in which individual’s with expensive hobbies signal wealth and freedom, 
Melanesian males signal status with their ability to devote time to extracurricular 
activities outside of typical food production requirements. Those within their society 
would view growers of long yams as individuals to ally with or marry (Bird & Smith, 
2005). 
 Meriam Islanders are also known to be both hunters and collectors of marine 
turtles.  The hunting of turtles was typically in conjunction with a public feast.  As an 
event is announced, skilled hunters will expend time and resources to acquire turtle meat.  
While hunting turtle prey is considered difficult, collecting of marine turtles is more of a 
seasonal ritual which requires minimal effort.  Hunters are considered to be generous in 
that they exert more energy, time, and risk in acquiring turtles for the planned public 
feasts.  Hunters are perceived as being leaders with organization and decision-making 
skills, willing to accept the additional costs for the good of the community.  These signals 
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of their quality likewise lead to increased social stature in attracting mates and deterring 
competitors (Bird & Smith, 2005). 
 Artistic elaborations were also seen as signals of cognitive and motor skill as well 
as available time for non-work activities.  Women with superior artistic ability were able 
to secure better marriages to those socially connected. It was also viewed within their 
societies that the level of skill in artistic ability was the signal that the woman has reached 
a marriageable age (Bird & Smith, 2005; Bowser, 2000). 
 Anthropological studies have also focused on signals within societies lacking 
regulations, especially in the area of healthcare. One recent study showed that patients in 
Ghana and Tanzania read and interpret observable trust signals from herbalists when 
deciding whom to trust for medical care (Hampshire, Hamill, Mariwah, Mwanga, & 
Amoako-Sakyi, 2017).  Patients were shown to be attracted to healers who were able to 
signal their technical expertise and good intentions.  If patients become better readers of 
the signals, they will be able to distinguish between good and bad herbalists making a 
clearer distinction between quality.  This may result in herbalists “raising their game” 
(Hampshire et al., 2017). 
Anthropologists have also studied signaling theory from religious perspectives. 
Costly signaling has been prevalent across many religious practices through individuals 
showing commitment. The physical and emotional toll that would exist on an individual 
for some religious rituals would be too difficult for one to fake thus participation was 
viewed as a favorable signal leading to increased status and access to mates (Irons, 2001; 
Dengh, 2017; Singh & Chatterjee, 2017; Sosis & Bressler, 2003). A signal with perceived 
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investment (cost) by the signaler carries strength and these signals will continue to shape 
human cultures and societies. 
Similar to how signals play an important role in survival and the expansion of 
species, signals are also important within organizations in the acquisition of resources 
and survival.  As the human race has evolved, humans have seen advantages of 
organizing as groups; and the need for exchanging services and goods that are plentiful 
for resources of need, has led to the creation of businesses.  In the same way that signals 
help reduce information asymmetry in evolutionary biology and anthropology, high 
quality signals likewise help reduce uncertainty in commerce.  In the next section, signals 
will be discussed further explaining signaling theory and how information asymmetry 
relates to quality and uncertainty within organizations. 
Signaling Theory in Organizations 
Signaling theory explains the process in which a sender sends a deliberate 
message to a receiver as a way to reduce information asymmetry between the sender and 
the recipient (Spence, 1973).  In his seminal piece, Spence (1973) theorized that 
employers look at specific attributes of potential new hires to speculate about potential 
work performance levels.  At time of hiring, there is uncertainty, for example, in how 
much time it will take the new hire to learn the job.  The hiring process is an investment 
that the company makes with a willingness to pay a specific wage for an expected level 
of contribution to the organization.  Unfortunately for the employer, there is no fool-
proof way to directly gauge the performance prior to hiring. However, there are a number 
of characteristics of the individual, such as education, prior work experience, physical 
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attributes, amongst others that can be observed.  While some of these characteristics 
cannot be altered, others can be manipulated (Spence, 1973).   
Education details, such as degree and the university attended, are signals that are 
considered relatively valuable.  A university degree signals to employers that time and 
money has been sacrificed by an individual to receive an education.  The signal is a 
costly signal.  The degree signals to employers that the potential new hire has potential 
capabilities of performing a function and that they can complete a task as they have 
persevered through years of schooling after receiving a high school diploma.  Knowing 
that potential employers value a job candidate with minimum education credentials, 
students weigh the benefits received from the time (opportunity cost) and expense in 
obtaining the degree. To an employer, the college degree signals that they will be a more 
productive future contributor to the company than one without a degree.  Because of the 
difference in perceived capabilities between graduates and non-graduates, employers are 
often willing to pay these individuals higher wages. However, the degree itself may or 
may not have a direct correlation with how well an individual will perform in comparison 
to a candidate without a degree—information asymmetry exists between an employer and 
the job candidate.  Therefore, individuals can reduce information asymmetry by 
securing—and communicating—an educational degree (Spence, 1973; Weiss, 1995).  As 
time progresses, new entrants enter the job market and new wages are offered based on 
performance of employees that were previously hired.  Thus over time, this feedback 
loop leads to revised expectations or beliefs from the signal (Spence, 1973). 
Akerlof (1970) explains that information asymmetry relates to quality and 
uncertainty.  Using the car market to illustrate, Akerlof segments cars into new or used 
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and good or bad vehicles.  Bad cars are often referred to as "lemons."  Both new or used 
cars could be good or bad.  When the car is new, both the buyer and the seller do not 
know if the car is good or if it will be a lemon.  However, if a car is used, the owner of 
the car who has had the car for a period of time has knowledge on whether the car is good 
or bad.  In the case of a used car, the seller of the vehicle has more knowledge about the 
quality in comparison to the buyer.  Akerlof points out that good cars and bad cars in the 
used market sell at the same price as the buyer is unable tell the difference in quality.  In 
addition, more used "lemons" hit the used market as the good ones are kept by the 
owners.  Because of the imbalance of good versus bad in the market, without additional 
information to otherwise show the difference, a good quality car will likely be viewed as 
if it is bad (Akerlof, 1970).  Since there are many attributes that are not easily seen by 
outsiders of a firm, business opportunities similarly have a challenge in distinguishing 
themselves high quality versus low quality (Janney & Dess, 2006).  "High quality 
entrepreneurs will have trouble attracting resources on favorable terms unless the 
entrepreneurs can differentiate themselves from similarly appearing peers" (Janney & 
Dess, 2006, p. 392).  The better an entrepreneur can signal the quality difference, the 
better its chance in receiving interest from investors as the opportunity will appear to be 
above average. 
Information asymmetry exists when one party has information that another party 
does not (Stiglitz, 2002).  Information asymmetry in capital markets has led to led 
investors to call for financial reporting and disclosures due to agency conflicts between 
company managers and investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  Since some signals can be 
misrepresented, signals that appear to be suspicious or that are easily manipulated are 
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disregarded by investors (Cohen & Dean, 2005).  “Information asymmetry can lead to 
difficulties in deal negotiations, especially ascertaining an accurate value for the firm” 
(Howorth, Westhead, & Wright, 2004, p. 513).  
Signaling theory consists of a communication loop with a sender (also known as 
the signaler) sending a signal to a receiver who interprets the signal ultimately returning 
feedback back to the signaler (Spence, 1973; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011).  
Each are discussed further in the next few sections. 
Signalers 
Signalers are insiders with information related to a quality of an individual, 
product, or organization that outsiders do not possess (Connelly et al., 2011).  In the 
entrepreneurship literature, individuals are typically the entrepreneurs with a business 
idea approaching potential investors such as angel investors or venture capitalists for 
investment (e.g., Elitzur & Gavious, 2003).  Product signaling is often used to 
communicate attributes about the product itself, such as quality (e.g., Kirmani & Rao, 
2000), and is most often seen in marketing literature.  Signalers at the organizational level 
in entrepreneurship literature can be at the early stage of development (e.g., Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003; Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005) or later, as firms pursue initial public 
offerings (e.g., Certo, 2003; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2005; Jain, Jayaraman, and Kini, 
2008).  Though signalers are insiders that have private information that may be positive 
or negative, signaling theory focuses on the positive attributes that are conveyed 





The signal itself is complex.  Signals communicate new information that may 
alter a previous understanding (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005, p. 3).  The quality of a 
signal is best described as the linkage of the message being communicated from a 
signaler to the receiver and the signaler being able to actually carryout the requirements 
or promises of the message being sent.  In the new venture context, for a signal to be 
deemed appropriate, it must be observable, costly, honest, consistent, and frequent 
(Rutherford et al., 2017).  In other words, some signals may be better than others.  Those 
with information to communicate should consider the two characteristics of efficacious 
signals - signal observability and signal cost.  Signal observability explains the 
noticeability of a signal by an outsider whereas signal cost explains the resources 
required to express or deliver a signal (Connelly et al., 2011).  Often labeled differently, 
this definition of signal observability encompasses other terms used in signaling theory 
literature including signal clarity, intensity, strength, and visibility (Connelly et al., 
2011).  Signals that can be received and understood with minimal error are viewed as 
having high signal clarity (Heil & Robertson, 1991).  Signal intensity relates to emphasis 
placed on sending signals.  In the context of products, high intensity relates to increased 
volume of marketing, promotion, and advertising.  However, as Lampel and Shamsie 
(2000) point out, increased intensity does not increase the probability of effectiveness as 
competing messages may increase uncertainty.  Signal strength refers to the relative 
power of the signal as some signals are more influential than others (Ramaswami, 
Dreher, Bretz, & Wiethoff, 2010).  Signal visibility explains the context of where or 
when a signal will be influential (Ramaswami et al., 2010). 
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Signal costs differ for firms.  Firms that are considered high-quality are those that 
possess valuable resources, such as knowledge, that provides a competitive advantage 
over low-quality firms which do not.  From a signaling perspective, these high-quality 
firms are able to gain access to additional resources at an advantageous cost difference 
over the low quality firms (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004).  Signal honesty describes the 
situation in which the signaler actually possesses the attributes being transmitted with the 
signal. In signaling theory literature, signal honesty is also referred to as signal veracity 
(Busenitz et al., 2005).  When the signal given off by the signaler matches the unobserved 
quality being conveyed, the signal is said to have signal fit and when the signal has both 
honesty and fit making it credible, it is said to have signal reliability (Connelly et al., 
2011).  The quantity of the signals sent (the signal frequency) and the timing of signals 
can affect the effectiveness of the signal (Janney & Folta, 2003).  In order to build trust, 
entrepreneurs need to signal ability and integrity early in the relationship with potential 
financiers (Pollack, Barr, & Hanson, 2017).  Signals themselves can be both positive and 
negative and how a receiver interprets them can be different.  As Fischer and Reuber 
(2007) point out, stakeholder groups often process signals differently based on their 
motivations to learn more about the signals.  As they point out, motivations may come 
from the importance that is placed on the signal.  For example, a stakeholder that has high 
reliance on the signaler may be motivated to learn more about a signal before making 
judgment in comparison to a stakeholder that has low dependence on a signaler.  Signals 
can also be classified as pointing (signals that separate signalers from competitors), 
activating (signals that separate signalers from competitors that turn on the signaler’s 
characteristic), intent (signals that are often future based often conditional on a response), 
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camouflage (signals that disguise potential liabilities), or needs based (signals that send 
requirements to receivers) (Connelly et al., 2011). 
A signal is the message being communicated and is not part of a signaler 
(Nguyen, 2009), as it is not part of an individual, product, or organization.  “A signal is 
not a signal when it comes from an ill-informed or self-interested source” (Hannon & 
Milkovich, 1995).  This means that a signal can be distorted and if a receiver is not well-
informed enough, may be confused or misinformed.  As mentioned previously, signals 
can be both positive and negative.  A negative signal, for example, may be an unplanned 
loss of a number of executives.  This may signal to a board that their management style 
and/or strategic direction has not been well received (Perkins & Hendry, 2005).  
Receivers of this information, such as investors, may reduce the valuation of the sender 
based on receiving these negative signals (Block, De Vries, Schumann, & Sandner, 
2014).  Other negative signals can exist when companies attempt to raise funds.  
Companies that are required to issue more shares in an attempt to raise more capital is 
viewed as a negative signal in public markets (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  Though negative 
signals are typically not desirable, they are not always detrimental to a firm (e.g. Fischer 
& Reuber).  
Receivers 
Receivers are the individuals or groups which process the signals from signalers.  
Most frequently in entrepreneurship related literature, receivers are either existing or 
potential investors, however signals to other stakeholders have been studied which 
include signals to customers (e.g., Lampel & Shamsie, 2000; Chung & Kalnins, 2001), 
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employees (e.g., Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Highhouse, Thornbury, & Little, 2007), 
and competitors (e.g., Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006) (Connelly et al., 
2011).  Receivers may “key in on a variety of signals and have differing views of the 
validity, interpretation, and importance of any one signal” (Busenitz et al., 2005).  In 
addition, for a signal to be delivered effectively, there needs to be receiver attention in 
which receivers have their radars on “scanning the environment” (Connelly et al., 2011).  
Receivers will process the signals differently. This processing, known as receiver 
interpretation, causes recipients to weigh signals differently due to preconceived notions 
about the signals intent (Branzei, Ursacki‐Bryant, Vertinsky, & Zhang, 2004; Ehrhart & 
Ziegert, 2005).  For example, in the context of strategic change, receivers process and act 
upon information through sensemaking and sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). 
It is important to recognize that at times, multiple signalers, receivers and/or 
signals may exist and that signalers may even try to deceive receivers (Connelly et al., 
2011).  In competitive environments, some signals given off by signalers are “false” as 
signalers attempt to trick receivers into selection (Johnstone & Grafen, 1993).  
Environmental distortion can also occur when signals get blurred due to surrounding 
factors both internal and external to an organization (Connelly et al., 2011).  The medium 
in which the signal is being relayed and delivered can affect the quality of the signal. 
Outside forces such as competitors or peers can alter the way a signal is received and 
processed.  For example, competitors acquiring companies within a specific industry 
space may make a company more attentive to opportunities that become available for 
investment or acquisition. Another example is that different financial markets view 
relational strengths between young firms and venture capital or investment banks 
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differently in dissimilar market conditions at the initial public offering stage (Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003).  
Feedback 
The final component of the communication loop is the feedback that travels back 
from the receiver to the signaler.  Information that gets transmitted back is known as a 
countersignal (Connelly et al., 2011) and this feedback serves as a way for the signaler to 
receive an understanding of the signal’s effectiveness (Gupta, Govindarajan, & Malhotra, 
1999).  The feedback that gets sent back to the signaler is useful to understand which 
signals are reliable and receive attention, along with information on how signals are being 
interpreted (Connelly et al., 2011).  In the context of entrepreneurs and new ventures, 
processing the countersignals can help in understanding which signals are positive and 
which ones are negative and adjust their business investment pitch accordingly.  
Countersignals can come in a number of forms.  For an interested investor, countersignals 
may be in the form of additional engagement such as follow-up questions to fully 
understand the business opportunity.  Another positive countersignal may be in the form 
of an investment offer or term sheet.  Negative countersignals that may be sent back to 
the signaling entrepreneur may be in the form of a response that terminates future 
discussions such as a decline in interest.  Another negative countersignal may be in the 
form of a non-responsive investor.  While one could speculate that a non-response is due 
serious consideration, the reality is that an extended period of time without a response is 
at best a pause in the communication loop, but potentially the end of the communication 
or negotiation (if a negotiation has already begun). 
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 When looking at antecedents for characteristics of entrepreneurial firms, 
antecedents are the characteristics of the signals themselves as long as the signals are 
honest and truthful.  For example, for an opportunity to be perceived as having quality, 
the opportunity must have high quality inputs (resources) and productivity assets which 
could lead to success (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005).  Then as a 
company becomes successful gaining a reputation of prominence, it would potentially be 
due to the antecedents of achievements or rankings along with affiliations with high-
status actors (Rindova et al., 2005) that can be signaled.  For online retailers, for example, 
a national reputation and impressive company size are antecedents to the signal that 
conveys legitimacy and lead to consumer trust (Wang, Beatty, & Foxx, 2004).   
 In the context of new venture fundraising, the antecedents of preparedness and 
cognitive legitimacy are shown to have a positive relationship to the amount of funding 
received by entrepreneurs seeking equity investment (Pollack et al., 2012).  Preparedness 
explains how entrepreneurs develop content appropriate to their audience, which in this 
context are investors.  Specifically, entrepreneurs can communicate this content through 
signals.  The antecedent of cognitive legitimacy plays an important role in signaling 
confidence to investors that the firm will succeed (Pollack et al., 2012).  The signals that 
new ventures can send will be covered in greater detail in the next section. 
Signals in other Social Contract Literatures  
 Signaling theory has been applied across many disciplines.  For example, in 
marketing, signaling theory has been used with branding to communicate superiority as 
attributes of a product such as quality are often unobservable (Rao, Qu, & Ruekert, 1999; 
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Kirmani & Rao, 2000).  The potential longevity of a brand has also been signaled through 
corporate sponsorships such as stadium naming rights.  This costly signal to a company 
has shown to have a positive effect on a company’s share price (Clark, Cornwell, & 
Pruitt, 2002). 
 Costly signals and honest signals in the manufacturing space relate to obtaining 
accreditation or certification that not all peer firms have achieved.  For example, being 
accredited at the quality standard of ISO 9000 is shown to have a positive relationship 
with increased revenue due to the perception of a higher quality product (Terlaak & King, 
2006). 
 In finance, companies that decide to engage with management consultants see 
increases in stock prices as there is a signal of potential changes with expert advisors 
seeking strategic opportunities (Bergh & Gibbons, 2011). Strategically, a number of firms 
during the Internet boom, received increases in share price by changing their corporate 
names to end in “.com” as it signaled a change in their business models (Lee, 2001).  
Signals are also used in corporate finance to reduce perceived risk.  For example, 
organizational virtue, defined as the “ethical character traits that are learnt from an 
accumulative perception of a firm’s behavior in everyday business life, that drives 
internal and external stakeholder satisfaction, and that is aligned with its ethical values 
used for strategic positioning,” (Chun, 2005, p. 272) exhibited in IPO prospectuses 
reduces uncertainties for investors (Payne, Moore, Bell, & Zachary, 2013). 
 Organizations use signals such as job titles as a way to signal individuals inside a 
company have knowledge and experience, hierarchy, and/or responsibilities within a 
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firm.  The job title signal also serves as way for stakeholders outside of the firm to know 
that they are interacting with the appropriate person to address an issue (Martinez, Laird, 
Martin, & Ferris, 2008). 
Signaling theory exists in everyday life as many individuals try to signal qualities 
to others. For example, adults often wear brand name clothing or have expensive toys like 
luxury cars and boats as a way to signal wealth (Nelissen & Meijers, 2011) and social 
status (Lee, Ko, & Megehee, 2015).  Signals are being communicated endlessly in our 
environment and though not everyone processes each signal the same, signals can (and 
do) have effects. 
Signals of New Ventures 
Signals play an important role in the growth of a company.  Based on Akerlof's 
(1970) work as summarized above, information asymmetry relates to quality and 
uncertainty.  Similar to how Akerlof (1970) described the imbalance of good versus 
“lemon” cars in the market and without additional information to otherwise show a 
difference, a high quality business will likely be viewed as low due to information 
asymmetry tainting quality and confidence of the business.  Businesses also have a 
challenge in distinguishing themselves with regard to high versus low quality (Janney & 
Dess, 2006).  Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, and Schweizer (2015) similarly have focused 
on quality and uncertainty in their work related to crowdfunding.  They use venture 
quality and level of certainty as determinants of funding success.  Ahlers et al. (2015) 
defines funding success in equity crowdfunding as whether a project is fully funded, the 
amount of funding raised by the campaign, the number of funders, and how rapid the 
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campaign gets funded.  While there are a number of equity crowdfunding websites which 
differ slightly in their processes and offerings, generally, the type of investor, investment 
size, and fundraising process differs from traditional fundraising of new ventures since 
the process lacks the negotiation that is inherent in traditional capital fundraising.  In 
addition, the investment size in equity crowdfunding campaigns are small in comparison 
to angel seed or venture investments (Belleflamme et al., 2014).  That being said, much 
of the signaling that occurs from an entrepreneur in equity crowdfunding resembles that 
signaling that occurs in traditional capital fundraising.  Signaling can affect the value of 
the firm through reducing information asymmetries (Levy & Lazarovich-Porat, 1995), 
thus ultimately affecting funding success. 
Akerlof (1970) shows that information asymmetry relates to quality and 
uncertainty.   Ahlers et al. (2015) seemingly builds on this work taking these two 
determinants and breaking them down even further.  Venture quality consists of 
properties such as human capital, social capital, and intellectual capital (Ahlers et al., 
2015; Baum & Silverman, 2004).  Elevated levels of these components of venture quality 
have a positive effect on equity crowdfunding success, and thus it would be reasonable to 
believe that they would have a positive effect in traditional capital fundraising through 
business pitches.  
Human Capital Signals 
Human capital signals are qualities that the entrepreneurial team possess that are 
viewed positively by stakeholders.  Top management team legitimacy and reputation 
(e.g., Cohen & Dean, 2005; Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2012; Ko & McKelvie, 2018), 
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entrepreneurial team make-up (e.g., Baum & Silverman, 2004; Lagazio & Querci, 2018; 
Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Zimmerman, 2008; Federico, Rabetino, & 
Kantis, 2012), gender and racial diversity (e.g., Welbourne, Cycyota, & Ferrante, 2007; 
Roberson & Park, 2007), industry knowledge and experience (e.g., Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1984; Ko & McKelvie, 2018,; Kotha & George, 2012), and education (e.g., Cooper, 
Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Hsu, 2007) are shown to have effects on performance 
and serve as human capital signals.     
Social Capital Signals 
 Entrepreneurs with positive relationships or alliances with other partners can 
signal strength of a new venture.  New ventures with third-party alliances or affiliations 
(e.g., Plummer, Allison, & Connelly, 2016; Lee, Pollock, & Jin, 2011; Stuart, Hoang, & 
Hybels, 1999), well-known board members (e.g., Certo, 2003; Filatotchev & Bishop, 
2002; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001), large board diversity (e.g., Miller & del Carmen 
Triana, 2009), or existing high-profile investors or venture capitalists (e.g., Fisher, 
Kuratko, Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Plummer et al. 2016) are shown to have effects 
on performance and serve as social capital signals.  
Intellectual Capital Signals 
  Entrepreneurs with intellectual property can signal strength of a new venture. 
Patents and prototypes (e.g., Audretsch, Bönte, & Mahagaonkar, 2012; Baum & 
Silverman, 2004) and business plans (Mason & Stark, 2004) are shown to have effects on 




Financial Capital Signals 
 Positive financial capital signals are qualities that stakeholders seek to gain an 
understanding of a new firm's chance of survival.  Meaningful company financial 
projections (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015), management's certification of financial statements 
(e.g., Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), and positive industry growth rate projections (e.g., 
MacMillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985; McDougall, Covin, Robinson, & Herron, 1994) 
serve as positive financial signals of future performance.  
The Business Pitch and Negotiations 
Entrepreneurs use business pitches as a way to introduce the company to potential 
investors communicating company history, product and service details, and growth 
opportunities. Entrepreneurs look to present their value proposition to investors through a 
combination of storytelling and sensemaking (Pollack, Rutherford, and Nagy, 2012).  
These investor pitches are typically given at organizations or universities promoting 
economic development with the goal of linking entrepreneurs with angel investors. 
Business pitches are typically limited to short presentations followed by potential 
investor questions. Though pitch competitions often result in prizes to entrepreneurs with 
the best presentations, these competitions are used as a method to effectively and 
efficiently introduce entrepreneurs to potential investors for investment. The business 
pitch is a critical component of the entrepreneur strategy for obtaining investment 
(Pollack et al., 2012; Elsbach, 2003).   An entrepreneur pitching a business idea is similar 
to screenwriters pitching ideas to television executives.  Screenwriters act as “pitchers” 
often delivering 30-minute presentations to Hollywood executives wearing the “catching 
gear” (Elsbach, 2003).  Like entrepreneurial pitches, catchers often look to detect cues 
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from the pitch in deciding on whether the opportunity is worthwhile.  Business pitch 
decks help tell the story of the investment opportunity to investors.  However, the 
storytelling that occurs in a business pitch must be efficient emphasizing only relevant 
information for evaluation while minimizing the less important information.  Venture 
capitalists, for example, spend less than six minutes screening an investment opportunity, 
on average (Hall & Hofer, 1993). 
While passion is often thought of as being a differentiator in whether or not an 
entrepreneur gets funded, it is actually preparedness that impacts funding (Chen, Yao, & 
Kotha, 2009).  Preparedness behaviors of entrepreneurs are positively related to the 
perceived cognitive legitimacy of the business opportunity and this cognitive legitimacy 
is shown to predict the amount of funding the new venture receives (Pollack et al., 2012).  
Some of the major components of preparedness is tied directly to the entrepreneur.  An 
entrepreneur's credentials (compelling work history, education, objectives, and 
affiliations) create a mix of skills and experience that can potentially make a business a 
success.  However, having these characteristics are only part of the equation and they 
must be communicated to other stakeholders.  An entrepreneur's credentials and 
impression management behaviors are positively related to perceived cognitive 
legitimacy (Nagy, Pollack, Rutherford, & Lohrke, 2012). 
The venture capital investment decision making process has six stages, each with 
different activities occurring.  The six stages include: origination (sourcing of 
opportunities), venture capital firm-specific screening (elimination of non-fit investment 
opportunities), generic screening (high level review), first-phase evaluation (increased 
due diligence and meetings with the entrepreneurs to evaluate seriousness of interest), 
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second phase evaluation (in-depth determination of investment obstacles and 
development of strategies to overcome), and closing (Fried & Hisrich, 1994).  The 
general criteria used in evaluation of the business investment pitch include evaluating the 
concept (potential for earnings growth, a business idea that can be brought to market 
within two to three years, must offer a competitive advantage or be in a non-competitive 
industry, and must have reasonable capital requirements), management (must have 
personal integrity, done well at prior jobs, must be realistic, hardworking, flexible, have a 
thorough understanding of the business, exhibit leadership under pressure, and have 
general management experience), and returns (provide an exit opportunity, offer the 
potential for a high rate of return, and offer the potential for a high absolute return) (Fried 
& Hisrich, 1994).  Entrepreneurs that use symbolic actions to convey their credibility, 
professional organization, organizational achievement, and quality of stakeholder 
relationships are able to acquire the resources they need (Zott & Huy, 2007). 
Making sure that the story that is being told about the business opportunity is 
important for the opportunity to make it through the firm-specific screening stage.  
Entrepreneurs must use what Lounsbury & Glynn (2001) define as cultural 
entrepreneurship, the formation of a story by combining firm level resource capital and 
industry level opportunity capital, to legitimize the business opportunity and do it in a 
way that is aligned with the correct audience that will respond with a favorable 
interpretation. 
Different types of investors have different investment criteria.  Though each has 
the ability to fund a new venture’s growth, bankers, venture capital fund managers, and 
angel investors focus on different aspects of a business plan.  Depending on the target 
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investor, the entrepreneur must customize the pitch providing different levels of emphasis 
on the market, founders, financials, and investor fit (Mason & Stark, 2004).  Even within 
a category of investor type, there are differences in priorities.  For example, experienced 
VCs evaluate entrepreneurial team characteristics putting more emphasis on team 
cohesion, while novice VCs look more at the qualifications of the entrepreneurs (Franke, 
Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2008).  Venture capital firms or angel investors can have 
different types of industry experience, including operating experience, start-up 
experience, and/or investing experience in a focal industry (Mitteness, Baucus, & Sudek, 
2012) and thus an entrepreneur needs to customize the pitch to the audience. 
Similar to how articles and books can be written from various perspectives, 
stories from entrepreneurs can be constructed and told in different ways.  Ellen 
O’Connor’s (2002) typology of entrepreneurial narratives segments styles into three 
categories - personal, generic, and situational stories.  Personal stories are ones that are 
either founding (autobiographical) or vision (innovation related) stories that are created 
by the company’s founder.  Generic stories are ones that are typically more structured, as 
in a business plan, and consist of either marketing or strategy stories.  Situational stories, 
on the other hand, consist of historical (event related) or conventional (generally accepted 
beliefs of the industry) stories, that relate more to context that the founder does not 
necessarily control.  These narratives are used by entrepreneurs for three purposes: 1) 
justifying the organization, 2) to influence resource gathering, and 3) to make near-term 
key decisions (O’Connor, 2002).  Well-constructed stories also help entrepreneurs 
acquire financial resources by creating unambiguous identities of entrepreneurs, 
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explaining simply how exploitation will reduce risk, and using context to familiarize 
those unfamiliar with the opportunity (Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007). 
The business pitch serves as a way to introduce the opportunity to angel investors 
and venture capitalists for evaluation.  Venture capitalists evaluate new ventures based on 
the information provided in business pitches or business plans.  Surveyed venture 
capitalists look to the quality of the entrepreneur, placing high priority in their experience 
and personality, when deciding whether or not to fund the venture (MacMillan, Siegel, & 
Narasimha, 1985).  One longitudinal study of a single VC firm, however, showed that the 
product/service fit was the major factor on whether or not to reject an opportunity, and 
not the management team (Petty & Gruber, 2011).  A study of angel investors showed 
that the strength of the entrepreneur is most important factor for deciding to proceed to 
due diligence then shifts to opportunity through evaluation process (Mitteness et al., 
2012). 
The opportunity attractiveness is in part related to the existing human capital 
(knowledge, skills, and abilities) of the entrepreneur (Haynie, Shepherd, & McMullen, 
2009).   Other conditions may lead to attraction outside of existing human capital due to 
rarity of opportunity, limited competition, and age of firm when considering the value of 
the opportunity (Haynie et al., 2009).  Investors also turn to the pitch to uncover 
predictors of a venture’s success, two of which include insulation from competition and 
demonstrated market acceptance (MacMillan, Zemann, & Subbanarasimha, 1987). 
Investors also look for objective verifiable information like a company’s level of 
sales, the venture’s status of organizing, and their marketing activities at the time of 
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investment (Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006).  An angel investor’s decision to move 
forward is based on the quality and content of the entrepreneur’s pitch and how it is 
delivered (Clark, 2008).  Entrepreneurs that fail to “sell” potential investors through their 
pitch, raises doubts that they will be able to convince customers to buy their products or 
services (Mason & Harrison, 2003). 
In the context of new ventures, it is common for entrepreneurs to have taken the 
path of bootstrapping prior to seeking a first round of equity financing.  “Bootstrapping is 
understood as the condition whereby start-up entrepreneurs operate (often in creative 
ways) their firms with no outside financial assistance” (Rutherford, 2015).  As Rutherford 
et al. (2017) point out, the fact that an entrepreneur is bootstrapping actually sends 
negative signals in that the entrepreneur has been unable to secure financing from 
outsiders, regardless of the entrepreneur’s reasoning to bootstrap.  Firms that are 
bootstrapping that are able to “fake” qualities may be able to do so in the short-run, but 
this often catches up with the entrepreneur due to the firm being undercapitalized 
(Rutherford et al., 2017).  Lack of honesty in signals sent will cause a low-quality firm 
that mimics a high-quality firm to lose money directly or indirectly (Kirmani & Rao, 
2000).  Limitations in acquiring resources for growth reveals that bootstrapping will lead 































The Negotiating Position – Power and BATNA 
Emerson’s power-dependence theory (1962) explains that negotiation outcomes 
are related to the degree that each negotiator is dependent upon one the other.  High 
dependency on the opposition leads to high opposition power in negotiations.  If 
alternatives to a negotiated deal lead a negotiator to be less dependent upon the 
opposition, the power of the opposition diminishes.  The higher the quality of the 
alternatives, the more power that a negotiator has in a negotiation (Raiffa, 1982).  Thus, 
best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) concept was introduced by Fisher 
and Ury in their 1981 book titled Getting to Yes.  “A minimally necessary condition for 
an agreement to be mutually acceptable is that each side prefers the deal to its BATNA” 
(Sebenius, 2017, p. 90).  To command power, an entrepreneur can use conciliatory 
power-use negotiation tactics, as opposed to hostile power-use tactics, and in this way, 
signal their willingness to jointly collaborate with investors as a way to attempt to appeal 
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to their investment needs and wants (Lawler, 1992; Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005).  As 
part of this positive negotiation approach, entrepreneurs attempt to improve their 
negotiation position (BATNA) by signaling that they have an attractive investment 
opportunity.  Information asymmetry is reduced as investors begin to see (or envision) 
customer adoption translated into revenue.  These negotiation concepts are discussed 
further in this section. 
The business pitch is the beginning of the negotiation between the entrepreneur 
and potential investors.  Negotiation has been defined as “an interpersonal decision-
making process necessary whenever we cannot achieve our objectives single-handedly” 
(Thompson, 2014, p. 2).  In new venture finance, negotiation plays a critical role in an 
entrepreneur acquiring necessary resources for growth.  However, many individuals are 
ineffective in the negotiating process; as they often leave money on the table, settle for 
too little, walk away from the table, or settle for worse terms than a better alternative 
(Thompson, 2014).  Over-aggressive or naïve negotiators may ask for extreme terms, 
causing the other party to walk away (Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012).  
Entrepreneur’s place a high value on their contribution to the success of a business.  In a 
related study, Franco‐Watkins, Edwards, and Acuff (2013) showed that for those that 
earned income through effort compared to those that received income from an unexpected 
windfall, that a there is a difference in level of fairness in negotiations.  An individual 
that earned through effort will value the rewards higher than if less effort was placed in 
receiving the reward.  As such, it is expected for entrepreneurs to place a higher monetary 
value on their efforts and want to be compensated accordingly through higher rewards 
than their financier due to their hard work building and creating their companies.  As 
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power-dependency theory relates, entrepreneurs feel that their contribution to the 
relationship is high, thus the power they have in the negotiation should accordingly be 
high resulting in better deal terms for themselves.  
To be effective negotiators, entrepreneurs must first understand the negotiation 
dynamics.  One core concept in negotiations that is generally recognized by scholars as 
being important is power.  Sociologist Max Weber (1947) defined power as “the 
probability that a person can carry out his or her own will despite resistance” with most 
power theorists agreeing with this broad definition (Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005, p. 
800; Weber, 1947).  “A negotiator’s power may be critical for the quality of his or her 
success, because it can determine the allocation of rewards in an agreement” (Kim et al., 
2005, p. 799).  In new venture finance, the allocation of rewards that is referred to in the 
previous quote is the amount of equity that the entrepreneur must offer to an investor for 
the desired capital in the equity financing negotiation.  Power has been researched and 
described differently throughout literature.  Some of the most accepted explanations 
include: 1) French and Raven’s (1959) bases of power which includes reward, coercive, 
expert, legitimate, referent, and information powers; 2) Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson’s 
(1980) typology of influence tactics and the extensions provided by both Kipnis and 
Schmidt (1983) and Yukl and Tracey (1992) which includes pressure, legitimation, 
exchange, coalition, ingratiation, rational persuasion, inspirational appeal, consultation, 
and personal appeal; and 3) Emerson’s (1962) power-dependence theory.  Kim et al.’s 
(2005) dynamic model of negotiator power points out that though each of these 
descriptions have benefits of explaining power, they collectively fail to account for the 
dynamic context inherit in a negotiation.  Kim et al. (2005) point out that French and 
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Raven’s (1959) bases of power does not examine relational power between others. They 
also point out that Kipnis et al.’s (1980) examine post relational power without 
accounting the antecedents of the relationship.  Emerson’s power-dependence theory 
(1962) explains relative and total power as one party in a negotiation gains an upper hand 
over the other and uses this power to improve one’s outcome.  Kim et al. (2005) explains 
that Emerson’s work fails to examine the valuation that one places on relationships or 
alternatives as well as how power will be used.  While Kim et al. (2005) point out some 
of the shortcomings of the three, they acknowledge that they are important building 
blocks and that their work extends the literature to consider the “strategic acts” that occur 
in a dynamic negotiation. 
The theoretical dynamic model of negotiator power proposed by Kim et al. (2005) 
builds on Emerson’s power-dependence theory (1962) dividing power into four 
components: 1) potential power; 2) perceived power; 3) power tactics; and 4) realized 
power.  Potential power is dependent upon ones dependence upon another which comes 
from the valuation of both the current negotiation and alternatives if a deal is not reached 
(Emerson, 1962, Kim et al., 2005).  French and Raven’s (1959) power bases are used by 
negotiators to formulate valuations of the implications of the negotiation as well as if the 
benefits can be obtained through alternative means (Kim et al., 2005).  Perceived power 
is developed by assessing another’s potential power (Kim et al., 2005).  These 
perceptions are a function of one’s opinion of quantity, probability, and weight assigned 
to alternatives and contributions exchanged in a negotiation (Kim et al., 2005).  In other 
words, a negotiator needs to evaluate details to formulate likely outcomes to take 
appropriate next steps in a negotiation.  Negotiators can attempt to use or change power 
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within a negotiation through power-change or power-use tactics. Power-change tactics 
are initiatives that negotiators use to improve their power position as they perceive their 
power lower than their counterpart (Kim et al., 2005; Lawler, 1992).  Negotiations fall 
within Emerson's power-dependence theory (1962) as parties are dependent upon one 
another to complete transactions.  Within a negotiation, different levels of power can 
exist and be used, which makes negotiation a dynamic exercise.  Imbalance of power 
leads to negotiators to take steps to improve their outcomes.  A negotiator can (1) 
increase the quality of his or her alternatives, (2) decrease the quality of their 
counterpart’s alternatives, (3) decrease the valuation of the counterpart’s commitment to 
bargaining outcomes, or (4) increase the counterpart’s valuation of the negotiator’s 
commitment to bargaining outcomes (Kim et al., 2005; Rutherford, Tocher, Anderson, & 
Buller, 2012).  Power-use tactics are used by negotiators when they feel that their level of 
power is at a point they can influence (Kim et al., 2005).  Yukl and Tracey’s (1992) 
typology of influence tactics (pressure, legitimation, exchange, coalition, ingratiation, 
rational persuasion, inspirational appeal, consultation, and personal appeal) are methods 
that can be used to influence the negotiation.  Power-use tactics can be either conciliatory 
or hostile.  Conciliatory tactics are positive in nature, such as encouraging collaboration, 
whereas hostile tactics are negative, such as using intimidation to influence outcomes 
(Kim et al., 2005).  The use of conciliatory tactics first requires an understanding of other 
party’s outcome desires (Kim et al., 2005), thus, the more that an entrepreneur 
understands an investor’s needs and wants, the more likely he or she will be able to 
influence the investor. 
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Power-dependence theory looks at the relationship between negotiators and how 
alternatives create less dependency and how contribution increases one’s position of 
being dependent upon.  However, it is possible that both parties may see that they are 
dependent upon each other and that they both contribute equally.  When two parties 
combine their resources from a negotiation, the combination may be greater than the 
parts.  The benefits obtained from the negotiation is referred to as realized power (Kim et 
al., 2005).  In new venture finance, though, there is a negotiation between the 
entrepreneur and potential investors over the equity financing terms, the ultimate goal is 
for the resources to improve the position of both parties over time.  For negotiations in 
which long-term relationships are being secured, conciliatory power-use tactics are 
suggested over hostile tactics “to retain some potential power for their future 
interactions” (Kim, et al., 2005, p. 819). 
Power can exist when one party has more options than the other.  Possessing high 
quality alternatives is an effective way to increase the power of a negotiator (Raiffa, 
1982).  BATNA is the defining the point in which a “rational negotiator will exit a 
current negotiation” (Pinkley, Conlon, Sawyer, Sleesman, Vandewalle, & Kuenzi, 2017, 
p. 16,888).  An entrepreneur’s BATNA implies the minimum terms that one would 
accept as a seller of equity of their company.  For an investor, the BATNA implies the 
maximum terms one would be willing to offer and invest in exchange for equity in an 
entrepreneur’s company (Sebenius, 2017).  For a deal to be accepted, negotiators must 
value its terms at a level higher that their BATNAs (Sebenius, 2017).  Negotiators should 
work to obtain alternatives and then inform their negotiation opponents about the 
alternatives as it increases gains in a negotiation and reduces the probability of an 
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impasse (Pinkley, 1995).  The existence, and quality level of, alternatives affect 
negotiation outcomes (Arunachalam, Dilla, Shelley, & Chan, 1998).  Based on Emerson’s 
power-dependency theory (1962), as the opposition recognizes this dependency and that 
the other party has alternatives, the opposition has less leverage in the negotiation. 
As having quality alternatives is directly related to power within the power-
dependence theory model, it is important to understand the literature related to BATNA 
(see table 2).  An agreement must fall within the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), the 
range established by what would be considered acceptable by each party (Sebenius, 
2017).  A first offer serves as an anchor during a negotiation (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & 
Medvec, 2002) and by considering the opponent's BATNA, the ZOPA can be established 
(Sebenius, 2017).  At times, negotiators consider information about the opposition prior 
to the initial offer and adjust their offers considering this information.  A recent study by 
Eichstädt, Hotait, and Dahlen (2017) shows that alternative offers, additional information 
(knowledge of another's reservation or BATNA), and time pressure influence 
negotiations.  Maaravi, Pazy, and Ganazach's (2011) study showed that the amount of the 
first offer was affected by the other party's wealth or by either their perceived or actual 
ability to pay.  This phenomenon is similar to what tourists experience at gift shops in 
foreign countries that rely on negotiating prices instead of marked prices.  The bargaining 
zone that is established by each party's BATNA, defines the resources that need to be 
distributed during the negotiation (Kim & Fragale, 2005).  However, the benefits of a 
superior BATNA diminishes as the bargaining zone grows (Kim & Fragale, 2005).  One 
can speculate that there is a point at which the opposition can no longer give as there is 
nothing left to give in the negotiation.  Superior contribution is shown to increase benefits 
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as the bargaining zone grows (Kim & Fragale, 2005).  Similarly, one can speculate that as 
one party is 'upping the ante' as far as what they are providing to the relationship, they are 
further justifying their value and thus reap the benefits from the increase.  Empirical 
evidence shows that final agreements favor those making the first offer due to the offer 
being an anchor which defines a negotiators position (Galinsky et al., 2002).  Initial 
offers are mainly influenced by information about the other party's BATNA (Buelens & 
Van Poucke, 2004).  During a negotiation, considering an opponent's alternatives helps 
negotiators overcome first offer anchors for better bargaining results (Galinsky & 
Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2002).  Evidence shows that negotiators with multiple 
offers in comparison to those with single offers make lower first offers, even with 
identical BATNAs (Schaerer, Loschelder, & Swaab, 2016).  A situation known as 
distributive disadvantage occurs which causes negotiators to consider lower offers even 
when they are told to focus on the best offer (Schaerer et al., 2016).  As shown expressed 
by several studies above, though multiple have advantages, if offers are of low quality, 
they can have an overall negative effect. 
As negotiations evolve and become more complex, those with an understanding 
of their BATNA options know their limitations and when they should or should not act 
on an offer.  Entrepreneurs must understand the price and terms which make sense for 
them to walk away in negotiations.  Before beginning negotiations, a negotiator should 
identify the point that they will not go (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985).  The least acceptable 
agreement point that is better than selecting an alternative is commonly referred to as the 
reservation price or reservation value (Sebenius, 2017). 
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Most negotiations occur with incomplete information.  That is, one party does not 
know the other’s reservation value or BATNA.  When one party has this information 
about the other party, they have a superior negotiating position (Eichstädt, Hotait, & 
Dahlen, 2016).  Once the other party's BATNA is known, negotiators tend to neglect their 
own priorities; and instead, focus upon the other party's BATNA (Buelens & Van 
Poucke, 2004).  For example, when a negotiator receives past performance information 
about an opponent, it leads to higher aspirations of the negotiator that received the 
information (Zarankin & Wall, 2012).  Empirical evidence indicates that there is a 
positive relationship between company wealth and the ability to obtain alternatives 
(Maaravi et al., 2011).  Unfortunately, at the point of new venture funding, not much 
company wealth exists.  From the beginning of the negotiation, entrepreneurs are at a 
disadvantage in that investors understand the liability of newness issues that 
entrepreneurs face.  Investors know that debt financing options are typically not available 
and that entrepreneurs have to seek equity financing as an alternative thus this 
strengthens the investor’s negotiating position.  Fairness is often in the eye of the 
beholder.  Strong negotiators believe results should reflect power advantage whereas 
weak negotiators believe in equality (Wong & Howard, 2017). 




















As noted, improved alternatives lead to increased power in a negotiation 
(Rutherford et al., 2012).  In order to increase power in negotiations through the increase 
of number and/or quality of alternatives, one must first develop viable alternatives and be 
able to signal these alternatives to the other party in a negotiation (Rutherford et al., 
2012).  More alternatives or higher caliber options that negotiators appear to have, the 
less power can be used against them. Conversely, in order to increase power in 
negotiations through the decrease of number and/or quality of alternatives, one must 
reduce the “perception of the viability and/or quality of the other party’s alternatives” 
(Rutherford et al., 2012, p. 344).  Similar to supply and demand dynamics in markets, by 
reducing the supply (in this case, the quantity of or quality of alternatives), demand (or 
leverage) increases.  When decreasing the valuation of the stakeholder’s commitment to 
bargaining outcomes, one must build a case in why the resources being provided by the 
other party are not as valuable as the other perceives (Rutherford et al., 2012).  This is 
often done by creating additional alternatives removing the dependency.  Finally, when 
increasing the stakeholder’s valuation of the entrepreneur’s commitment to bargaining 
outcomes, one must use techniques to emphasize the quality or uniqueness of what is 
being offered in the negotiation (Rutherford et al., 2012).  The better that one can 
articulate the value that is being offered, potentially in the way of intellectual property or 
other competitive advantages, one can increase the value perception.  This is something 
that can be achieved through signaling to the opposition. 
Goals, not just high quality BATNA alternatives of negotiators, may lead to 
higher negotiation outcomes (Brett et al., 1996). Entrepreneurs seeking investment 
typically have a BATNA which is based on their personal goals and needs.  For 
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entrepreneurs, the goal is often maintaining as much equity in their company in 
negotiations while obtaining the needed resources such as growth and human capital.  
When goals are not met, one must be willing to walk away.  The perception of the 
willingness to walk away strengthens a negotiation position (Sebenius, 2017).  
Negotiators that show they care less about obtaining agreement gain power as it creates a 
perception of a high BATNA and low dependence on the other party (Eichstädt, Hotait, 
& Dahlen, 2016, p. 92).  The strength (or weakness) of one’s BATNA is what I will 
define as their negotiating position.  An entrepreneur with alternatives would be 
considered to have a strong negotiating position.  The more options, the stronger the 
negotiating position. 
When better alternatives exist, it is much easier to walk away (Brett et al., 1996).  
At times, those in a negotiation put weight into an option that they hope may exist but 
actually does not, at least at the time of making critical decisions in a negotiation.  A 
phantom alternative, known as a phantom BATNA in negotiation terms, is a “choice 
option that looks real but is unavailable at the time a decision is made” (Pratkanis & 
Farquhar, 1992, p. 103; Conlon, Pinkley, & Sawyer, 2014).  For new ventures, other 
perceived alternatives may or may not be real or obtainable.  Conlon et al. (2014) suggest 
that there is always a BATNA, but the level of certainty may be low in some instances.  
They suggest that one may have multiple alternatives, but the one with the highest 
probability should drive a negotiator's power.  Entrepreneurs must make critical choices 
on weights to place on BATNAs during a negotiation.  A study by Schaerer, Swaab, and 
Galinsky (2015) showed that having no power (as defined as no BATNA) was better than 
negotiating with little power (a weak BATNA).  The lack of an alternative allows a 
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negotiator to be more aggressive in their initial offers and this has shown to lead to better 
results (Schaerer et al., 2015).  At least some weight should be considered as those 
negotiating with phantom alternatives are shown to negotiate better than those 
negotiating without an alternative (Pinkley et al., 2017).  Phantom BATNAs, though they 
can improve outcomes, can also be misguiding as they may be far from reality (Conlon et 
al., 2014). 
In new venture funding, entrepreneurs can potentially counterbalance the 
advantage that investors have in the negotiation by signaling that they have an attractive 
investment opportunity.  Similar to supply and demand economics, Cialdini (2009) notes 
that availability influences value perception in that we put more value in opportunities 
when then they are scarcer.  Entrepreneurs, who are able to be influential in their 
businesses pitches in that their opportunity is unique, may be able to invoke fear in an 
investor that they may miss out on an opportunity.  The term fear of missing out (FoMO) 
has been defined “as a pervasive apprehension that others might be having rewarding 
experiences from which one is absent” where “FoMO is characterized by the desire to 
stay continually connected with what others are doing” (Przybylski, Murayama, DeHaan, 
and Gladwell, 2013, p. 1841).  Hodkinson (2016) performed an exploratory qualitative 
study on FoMO to understand the phenomena at a deeper level.  Through the use of focal 
groups, Hodkinson analyzed the qualitative responses using both content analysis and 
thematic analysis techniques to show the importance and interrelatedness of the themes 
and concepts expressed by the groups. FoMO was “acknowledged as a negative 
emotional response to a choice situation, the degree of which was variable and, in the 
extreme, could manifest as fear in some individuals” and this manifestation was 
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“generally exhibited during the pre-decision process while consideration was being given 
to the importance of the decision, alternative possibilities and any anticipated post-
decision ramifications” (Hodkinson, 2016, p. 8).  He further identified four cognitive 
issues of those exhibiting FoMO which include opportunity cost, anticipated regret, 
perceived scarcity, and consideration of post-decision or post-event outcomes.  Each of 
these will be discussed further related to potential investors in business pitch funding 
events. 
Opportunity Cost 
Entrepreneurial risk has both the risk of failure and the risk of missing an 
opportunity.  An opportunity is defined as one’s personal view of a future situation that is 
both desirable and feasible and this level of desirability and feasibility is relative to the 
individual (Krueger, 1993).  While risk of failure can be explained as “sinking-the-boat” 
financially from poor decisions, risk of missing an opportunity relates to the upside that is 
not realized (Dickson & Giglierano, 1986).  Angel investors evaluate these same risks 
before exchanging seed capital in exchange for ownership equity. “In the FOMO context, 
an individual is attempting to optimize their net benefit by considering two elements. The 
first is the perceived (i.e. anticipated) benefits inherent in taking their preferred option, 
whereas the second is the anticipated combined detriments caused by not taking the other 
option(s)” (Hodkinson, 2016, p. 12).  Entrepreneurial discovery is through recognition 
and not search, and the prior knowledge related to markets, customer problems, and how 
to serve these markets will differ between individuals (Shane, 2000).  Opportunity cost is 
an evaluation of perceived risk and thus perception differs by individuals. For private 
investors, they have “a more intuitive, less quantitative, rather emotionally driven risk 
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perception” (Jordan & Kaas, 2002, p. 130; Olsen & Cox, 2010).  In evaluating risk 
perception, they must consider the following four dimensions: “1) Downside risk: the 
perceived risk of suffering financial losses due to negative deviations of returns, starting 
from an individual reference point, 2) Upside risk: the perceived chance of realizing 
higher-than-average returns, starting from an individual reference point, 3) Volatility: the 
perceived fluctuations of returns over time, 4) Ambiguity: a subjective feeling of 
uncertainty due to lack of information and lack of competence” (Jordan & Kaas, 2002, p. 
130). 
Anticipated Regret 
Past choices can influence future behaviors.  Experienced regret, which is regret 
based on prior decisions, influences individual investment decision-making (Bailey & 
Kinerson, 2005).  This experienced regret could be due to action or inaction of an 
individual. Anticipated regret, which is an unpleasant feeling that will result of inaction 
(Abraham & Sheeran, 2003), has been found to predict intention (e.g. Richard, de Vries, 
& van der Pligt, 1998) as well as moderate the relationship between intention and 
behavior (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999).  The fear due to the anticipation of what the outcome 
may be if the investor misses out on the opportunity can influence behavior. 
Perceived Scarcity 
Basic supply and demand logic influences pricing and behaviors.  This 
phenomenon is displayed by daily fluctuations of oil and gas prices as a result of 
production and demand.  Similarly, perceived scarcity of consumer products is shown to 
impact on assumed expensiveness.  Perceived scarcity of consumer products also impacts 
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the perceived uniqueness, and perceived uniqueness significantly influences perceived 
value thereby influencing purchase intentions (Wu, Lu, Wu, & Fu, 2012).  The perception 
of scarcity can have an effect on anticipated regret.  The regret of losing the chance of 
getting a bargain on a scarce item in an auction is likely to drive bidding upwards 
whereas regret of overpaying is the concern when items are not perceived to be scarce 
(Du, Abendroth, & Chandran, 2006). 
Consideration of Post-Decision and Post-Event Outcomes 
While fear response emotions typically occur during the pre-decision stage, an 
individual’s focus is “given to the importance of the decision, alternative possibilities and 
any anticipated post-decision ramifications” (Hodkinson, 2016).  Preservation of 
reputation is a concern for investors and thus they are concerned that they may receive a 
negative evaluation.  The fear of a negative evaluation is defined as the “apprehension 
about others’ evaluations, distress over their negative evaluations, avoidance of 
evaluative situations, and the expectation that others would evaluate oneself negatively” 
(Watson & Friend, 1969, p. 449).  Another social evaluation relates to schadenfreude.  
Schadenfreude is defined as the feeling of pleasure one gets at the expense of another’s 
misfortune (Takahashi, Kato, Matsuura, Mobbs, Suhara, & Okubo, 2009).  In competitive 
environments, some individuals take pleasure in their competitor’s misfortune.  For 
example, in the highly competitive arena of politics, those with a strong allegiance to a 
party are shown to experience schadenfreude when the opposition does something foolish 
(Combs, Powell, Schurtz, & Smith, 2009).  While one may enjoy the feelings from 
schadenfreude as others have misfortune, others may fear that the misfortune could 
happen to them.  In the Chinese culture, this is phenomenon is similar to “gaining or 
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losing ‘face’ because of positive or negative social evaluation” (Zhang, Cao, & 
Grigoriou, 2011, p. 130).  The fear of losing face is the equivalent of having the fear of 
experiencing schadenfreude.  In the context of investments, one might fear that another 
will find pleasure in their misfortune of missing out on the next unicorn opportunity.  
Incomplete Information in Negotiations 
Fear in negotiations can arise when another party is viewed to have a better 
bargaining position, another is perceived to have better preparation, or when one has 
insecurities about their negotiation skills (Adler et al., 1998).  Most successful people 
learn how to control these fear manifestations by using such techniques as calling a halt 
to negotiations to slow things down and to compose oneself in order to improve their 
performance (Adler et al., 1998).  Others realize that preparation is important before the 
negotiation so that they are aware of their best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
BATNA position (Fisher et al., 2011). 
“Incomplete information is seen by economists as a key source of inefficiency as 
it might cause delays in the negotiation or even a break-up in a situation where a positive 
zone of potential agreement exists” (Eichstädt, Hotait, & Dahlen, 2016, p. 93).  This 
incomplete information is often the reason that new ventures do not get funded.  If an 
entrepreneur cannot signal the opportunity that exists by investing in their business, an 
investor is not going to feel pressure (or fear) as the entrepreneur will not have 
successfully increased the number and/or quality of her own alternatives or altered the 
perceived valuations of the stakeholder and entrepreneur commitments to the bargaining 
outcomes.  Thus, proper signaling of opportunity characteristics becomes an important 
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component of the business pitch.  Not only can signals remove information asymmetry in 
the negotiation process that lead to less delays and break-up situations, clearer signals 
that get transmitted from entrepreneurs to investors may lead to better terms for an 
entrepreneur. 
Hypotheses 
 When there is minimal investor interest or lack of alternatives, entrepreneurs do 
not hold the cards in a negotiation.  Investors have goals to achieve lofty financial returns 
for the stakeholders they represent.  Investments in privately-held companies are typically 
of higher risk thus investors demand high return on investment, typically in the form of 
equity ownership in exchange for the growth capital needed by the entrepreneur.  With 
investment opportunities being presented to them regularly, investors generally have 
available alternatives.  However, market conditions, the desire to be active in certain 
industries, and/or their interest in a specific entrepreneur’s business opportunity may 
dictate investment actions.  Promising business opportunities are desirable to investors.  
There is the potential scarcity of opportunities that are most desirable.  However, 
entrepreneurs must be able to convey their quality traits to investors.  Signals have the 
ability to reduce information asymmetry allowing parties of a negotiation to transact with 
better evidence.  Tactics can be taken in negotiations to exert influence (Yukl and Tracey, 
1992).  Entrepreneurs have the ability to use conciliatory tactics to appeal to investor 
needs.  A new venture can attempt to influence through signals.  Positive signals related 
to a new venture’s human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and/or financial 
capital can be delivered through a business pitch giving potential investors characteristics 
about the business opportunity that are otherwise unknown.  The content of these 
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business pitches can be crafted in a way for the investor to make sense of the opportunity.  
“The pitch is a critical portion of the entrepreneur’s signaling and enticement strategy.  In 
some cases, it is the entrepreneur’s only signaling strategy” (Pollack et al., 2012, p. 916).  
An entrepreneur can use conciliatory tactics in their negotiation to signal to an investor’s 
needs and wants (Kim et al., 2005) to help influence their investment decision.  
Preparedness can help the entrepreneur when delivering a business pitch (Pollack et al., 
2012).  More specifically, a new venture can send human capital, social capital, 
intellectual capital, and/or financial capital signals as described below: 
Human Capital Signals: Having an entrepreneurial team can be a positive signal 
for investment.  Venture capitalists look at opportunities with top management teams 
when evaluating opportunities (Bachher & Guild, 1996; Muzyka, Birley, & Leleux, 
1996).  Top management team legitimacy is a signal that has an effect on valuation as 
investors perceive it as an indicator of economic potential of a company (Cohen & Dean, 
2005).  Businesses that are run by entrepreneurial teams can bring a more “diversified 
and skilled resource base” with a larger network of business contacts as well as increased 
firm legitimacy (Lagazio & Querci, 2018, p. 319; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 
1994).  More diversity in functional and educational backgrounds of top management 
teams signal quality of an IPO to investors and is shown to result in greater capital raised 
in an IPO (Zimmerman, 2008).  In larger firms, gender and racial diversity signals have 
been studied.  Gender diversity signaled in top management teams in large firms can lead 
to better performance in IPOs (Welbourne, Cycyota, & Ferrante, 2007).  Racial diversity 
reputation is shown to have a positive effect on book-to-market equity and diversity of 
leadership is shown to have a U-shaped relationship on book-to-market equity showing 
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that the positive effect comes in at a point after an initial decline (Roberson & Park, 
2007).  In addition, team size has been shown to be positively related to company growth 
(Federico, Rabetino, & Kantis, 2012).  More individuals bring greater resources to the 
new venture.  Top management team experience and skills are often used by venture 
capitalists as a predictor of future performance (Baum & Silverman, 2004).  Some of 
these skills come from the education of the team members.  Education level of the 
founding team can be an important human capital signal predicting performance (Cooper, 
Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994) and funding (Hsu, 2007).  Benefits of experience can 
come from several angles.  Industry-specific experience is shown to be an important 
signal to venture capital investment (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  Prior industry experience 
implies “that founders possess 1) tacit knowledge about customers and industry success 
factors, 2) experience with understanding opportunities in that industry, and 3) social ties 
with important stakeholders” which leads to an understanding of marketplace needs (Ko 
& McKelvie, 2018, p. 441; Kotha & George, 2012).  Prior founding experience has also 
been shown to have a positive signaling effect when trying to obtain financing, especially 
when individuals were successful in the past (Hsu, 2007).  Even if the entrepreneur did 
not start a business in the past, he or she may have had parents that were entrepreneurs.  
Having parents who owned a business has shown to increase firm survival, likely due to 
the fact that the entrepreneur would be more aware of and prepared for challenges related 
to business ownership (Cooper et al., 1994).  Education, experience, and skills are tools 
that can help build an entrepreneur’s reputation.  Founding member reputation is a human 




Hypothesis 1a: During an investment pitch, signals of high venture quality as a 
result of human capital positively affect the number of investor alternatives of a 
new venture. 
 Social Capital Signals: Business alliances are important for companies to gain 
access to needed resources (Ahlers et al., 2015; Baum & Silverman, 2004).  “In the 
context of early-stage financing, third party affiliations (venture development 
organizations) signal investors in two ways, by (1) endorsing the quality of the startup 
and founding team, and (2) communicating to investors that the third party will provide 
key substantive benefits to the startup” (Plummer, Allison, & Connelly, 2016 p. 6; Lee, 
Pollock, & Jin, 2011).  Private firms with prominent business partners are shown to go to 
an initial public offering (IPO) faster and have higher valuations at IPO (Stuart, Hoang, & 
Hybels, 1999).  Through affiliation, prestigious executives and directors are shown to 
have a positive linear effect on the value of a young firm (Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & 
Hambrick, 2010).  Early stage ventures heading for an IPO attempt to legitimize their 
company by adding well-known leaders to their boards of directors (Certo, 2003; 
Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002).  A large board structure with prestigious directors sends 
positive signals to investors in an IPO (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001).  In addition, 
CEO’s with “more external directorships may signal greater social capital and thus may 
be perceived as being more credible and trustworthy” (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009, p. 705).  
Other signals, like board diversity signal characteristics of social values within the firm 
(Miller & del Carmen Triana, 2009).  Alliances also have an effect on mortality rates.  
Relationships are shown to have a positive effect on firm survival when linked with 
institutions of greater legitimacy (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Baum & Silverman, 2004).  
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Firms that have connections with legitimate firms such as high-profile investors or 
venture capitalists signal to other stakeholders their acceptance as being considered 
legitimate (Fisher, Kuratko, Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Plummer et al. 2016).  There 
are benefits of finding alliance partners early that are well connected and have large 
networks themselves.  These networks also aid in gaining useful information that isn’t 
always available to the public (Ahlers et al., 2015).  By aligning with such partners such 
as prominent investors, new ventures are often able to expand their network to include 
those additional connections increasing the overall size of their network enabling better 
access to resources (Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009).  Financial commitments set forth by 
partners such as venture capitalists signal that the company will have access to resources 
thus be able to survive longer (Jain & Kini, 2000). 
Hypothesis 1b: During an investment pitch, signals of high venture quality as a 
result of social capital positively affect the number of investor alternatives of a 
new venture. 
Intellectual Capital Signals: New ventures that create innovations often have 
difficulty in explaining both the appropriateness or showing the feasibility of their ideas 
(Audretsch, Bönte, & Mahagaonkar, 2012).  In some industries, start-ups with patents 
and prototypes are more likely to obtain equity financing as it shows feasibility to 
investors (Audretsch et al., 2012).  At times, working prototypes are beneficial to 
tangibly show a concept to potential investors.  Entrepreneurs that can formalize their 
ideas and designs are better able to explain their ideas that potentially would not be 
understood by investors (Ahlers et al., 2015; Cohen & Lemley, 2001).  By patenting a 
product or process, entrepreneurs can attempt to obtain a competitive advantage.  
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Entrepreneurs that are able to secure a patent for their innovations in products or 
processes are able to obtain 20-year monopoly protections (Baum & Silverman, 2004).  
Firms with patents are shown to be able to obtain other growth resources such as 
investment capital and partners (Baum & Silverman, 2004).  Likewise, a study of biotech 
firms with patent pending applications were positively correlated with chance of survival 
(Silverman & Baum, 2002).  “Patent ownership can serve somewhat of a deterrent 
against future market entrants, which could also be interpreted as a positive signal of a 
company’s strength and quality (Ahlers et al., 2015).  Business plans are often required 
by investors and lenders to get an understanding of a company’s strategy and approach 
before a transaction.  Business plans can and should be tailored towards the appropriate 
audience as different stakeholders focus on different details (Mason & Stark, 2004).  
Bankers look to market and finance issues as they are concerned about debt repayment 
where-as equity investors like angels and venture capitalists look for return on their 
investment (Mason & Stark, 2004).  Even equity investors review business plans 
differently as angel investors put more emphasis on their ‘fit’ with the business than do 
venture capitalists (Mason & Stark, 2004).  "Most potential funders wish to see a 
business plan as a first step in deciding whether or not to invest” (Mason & Stark, 2004, 
p. 227) thus going through the process of strategic planning is a signal of preparedness to 
investors. 
Hypothesis 1c: During an investment pitch, signals of high venture quality as a 
result of intellectual capital positively affect the number of investor alternatives of 
a new venture. 
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Financial Capital Signals: Entrepreneurs with financial projections have a better 
understanding of potential resource deficiencies as they consider income and expense 
timing.  When financial projections do not exist, it leads to increased risk for an investor 
(Ahlers et al., 2015).  In addition, failure to create disclaimers creates uncertainty as 
achieving certain milestones are often based on specific conditions being met (Ahlers et 
al., 2015).  A business plan or prospectus allows “investors to analyze a venture’s 
attractiveness, providing a more precise overview of the risks and opportunities, and 
helping lessen the risk of asymmetric information” (Ahlers et al., 2015, p. 963).  
Companies that reveal more profitable futures in the information presented to outsiders 
send buying signals to potential shareholders (Connelly et al., 2011).  Again, an 
entrepreneur’s commitment to the organization helps alleviate moral hazards concerns as 
CEO’s send signals to investors through their certification of financial statements based 
on large shareholdings of a company (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009).  Where a company is 
heading financially is an important determinant for investment.  For example, high 
industry growth rate is viewed as the top market requirement for investment for venture 
capitalists (MacMillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985; McDougall, Covin, Robinson, & 
Herron, 1994).  Firms that provide guidance of their financial future send a positive 
signal and decrease the level of uncertainty.  After the company begins to have success in 
customer adoption, the company transitions from the formation stage to the early growth 
stage.  Like the formation stage, there is still a high level of uncertainty and additional 
resources are likely needed to manage the effects of increased demand (Dodge & 
Robbins, 1992).  A company is considered to be entering the early growth stage when 
they have achieved traction which is evident by achieving a respectable level of revenue 
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and is continuing to quickly increase over time.  Through this market acceptance, the new 
venture begins to increase its legitimacy.  A business that sends signals of high quality 
should increase the interest in investment thus improve an entrepreneur’s negotiation 
position (BATNA) by either increasing the number of interested investors or causing 
investors to feel that the quantity of available opportunities at the level of quality to be 
reduced as the positive signals increase the desirability (i.e. the investor potentially 
experiences FoMO).  Thus: 
Hypothesis 1d: During an investment pitch, signals of high venture quality as a 
result of financial capital positively affect the number of investor alternatives of a 
new venture. 
The quality of a signal can differ based on its characteristics.  For example, costly 
signals are more difficult to manipulate and thus become stronger indicators of truthful 
information (e.g., Spence, 1973; Bird & Smith, 2005).  Costly signals are those that are 
considered difficult to obtain preventing imitation by those of lower quality.  Not only 
monetary costs should be considered as signalers may exert energy or time towards 
obtaining a signal.  Education (e.g., Spence, 1973; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 
1994; Hsu, 2007), industry experience (Ko & McKelvie, 2018), alliances and affiliations 
(e.g., Plummer, Allison, & Connelly, 2016; Lee, Pollock, & Jin, 2011; Stuart, Hoang, & 
Hybels, 1999), and the development of patents and prototypes (e.g., Audretsch, Bönte, & 
Mahagaonkar, 2012; Baum & Silverman, 2004) all serve as costly signals.  Signal 
honesty (veracity) describes the truthfulness of messages.  Akerlof (1970) explains that 
information asymmetry relates to quality and uncertainty and that without honest signals, 
good quality cars may be penalized due to the negative qualities of “lemons.”  The 
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quantity of the signals sent (the signal frequency) can affect the effectiveness of the 
signal (Janney & Folta, 2003).  A business that sends signals with strong characteristics 
of being costly and honest should increase the interest in investment thus improve an 
entrepreneur’s negotiation position (BATNA) by either increasing the number of 
interested investors or causing investors to feel that the quantity of available opportunities 
at the level of quality to be reduced as the positive signals increase the desirability (i.e. 
the investor potentially experiences FoMO).  Thus: 
Hypothesis 2:  During an investment pitch, the positive relationship between high 
venture quality signals of a new venture and the number of investor alternatives is 
moderated by the signal characteristics of cost and honesty. 
An entrepreneur and investor must negotiate the deal structure in equity financing 
situations.  An entrepreneur will typically start with an asking (offer) price.  This price 
consists of two components: the amount of investment capital desired and the amount of 
equity that the entrepreneur is willing to exchange for the capital being requested.  The 
entrepreneur’s valuation of the firm is established by dividing the desired capital by the 
percentage stake in the business being offered in exchange (Smith & Viceisza, 2018).  
For example, if an entrepreneur is asking $200,000 for 20% of the company, the 
entrepreneur’s implied valuation of the firm is $1,000,000.  Investors may counter the 
entrepreneur’s asking price by offering an amount of capital that they are willing to invest 
for the percentage stake in the business that they desire for the amount of money they are 
offering.  The valuation calculation is similar in that the capital is divided by the 
percentage stake in the business.  Subsequent rounds of negotiations may continue until 
either both parties agree to terms that are acceptable or walk away.  As discussed earlier, 
73 
 
the liability of newness scares away debt financiers providing equity investors leverage as 
an entrepreneur's options for financing have been decreased.  However, when an 
entrepreneur can signal that they have available options, leverage begins to shift.  As 
alternatives become available to the entrepreneur, investors must become more 
competitive in the deal terms offered to a new venture.  Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: During an investment pitch, the positive relationship between high 
venture quality signals of a new venture and the investment valuation received is 








Identification of Signals and Computer-Aided Text Analysis 
In order to develop a list of potential signals that entrepreneurs can communicate 
to investors, a systematic review of literature was completed (Tranfield, Denyer, & 
Smart, 2003).  To further refine the scope, the articles selected: 1) were published in a 
peer-reviewed outlet; and 2) cover signaling theory in the context of entrepreneurs and/or 
small business owners.  Works that did not directly study signaling theory in an 
entrepreneurial context were eliminated.  Works that were related to initial public 
offerings were generally excluded due to the context being different as a result of 
different organizational life cycle stages (unless there appeared to be evidence in the 
article abstract that the signal may also apply to new ventures). 
 The search process involved several steps.  In the search criteria within Scopus, 
the search query inputted was [“signal* theory” OR signal*] AND [entrepreneur* OR 
innovation* OR intrapreneur* OR “new firm*” OR “new venture*” OR “small 
business*” OR “spin-off*” OR “spinoff*” OR “start-up*” OR “startup*” OR ventur*].  
Wildcards and truncated words were used in this string to extract different variations of 
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these keywords.  The query searched for the combination of words in the Title, Abstract, 
and Keywords of an article.  The additional search criteria limited the articles to: (1) 
Document Type: Article, Article in Press; (2) Source Type: Journals; and (3) Subject 
area: limited to Business, Management and Accounting and Economics, Econometrics 
and Finance.  Generally, books were excluded due to the practicality of retrieving data 
through remote library access.  A total of 877 articles were drawn from this initial query 
search.  The abstracts of these articles were then sorted for relevance based on signals in 
the context of this study.  This narrowing step of literature parsed the list down to 237 
articles.  This list was then further sorted by separating articles that related to new 
ventures and ones related to pre-IPO or post-IPO signals.  The articles related to new 
ventures totaled 185 articles.  These articles were downloaded using Scopus and Google 
Scholar and then were reviewed a level deeper beyond Title, Abstract, and Keywords 
looking into the article content to identify signals.  The signals present in the other 
articles were then categorized within the determinants of venture quality signals 
(represented by human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, or financial capital).  
These signals will be used in assisting in the creation of the word dictionaries. 
Linguistic word-based dictionaries will be created to operationalization the 
venture quality signals (human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and financial 
capital) as part of the computer-aided text analysis (CATA) process (Short, Broberg, 
Cogliser, and Brigham, 2010).  Individual word count systems classify text by assigning 
words to pre-specified equivalent categories (Weber, 1990).  Frequency counts of words 
in each category will be used to determine the relative importance of each signal category 
that the entrepreneur uses in their pitch.  The computer software program, DICTION, is 
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the initially proposed to software to be used, however, there are several programs capable 
of the analysis.  Through this methodology, the verbal pitch is converted into numbers 
that can be used in the quantitative analysis.  BATNA will be operationalized by 
recording the number of active investors presenting offers after a pitch which represents 
financing alternatives for the entrepreneur.   
Data 
 The data set being used in this analysis includes 294 Shark Tank business pitches 
from the episodes from seasons 1-6.  The Shark Tank business pitch content editing 
compresses negotiations into “palatable acts” leaving in all elements crucial to the 
outcome (Smith & Viceisza, 2018).  TranscriptionStar (iSource Solutions Inc.) was used 
to translate the episodes from video to text.  It is important to note that though there is 
useful information in the question and answer interaction that occurs between the 
entrepreneurs and investors after the initial business pitch, this study will solely focus on 
the business pitch prior to negotiations.  The rationale for implementing this boundary is 
that an entrepreneur has total control of the signals that they can send during the initial 
planned business pitch.  Entrepreneurs have a short window to present their business and 
have the opportunity to craft a story with the most essential information related to their 
business during this limited time.  Thus, an entrepreneur must be selective in the signals 
presented during their limited pitch time, focusing on the potential signals that they feel 






This study will be conducted by analyzing negotiations between entrepreneurs 
and investors in the context of a business pitch where entrepreneurs are looking for 
growth capital to address “the funding gap.”   
A spreadsheet will be created with the show episode number, pitch number, and 
airing date. The spreadsheet will also contain the following fields that will be obtained 
from watching the Shark Tank business pitches and will potentially be used as control 
variables: Name of Investor(s) making a bid; # of investors involved in making bids; 
Entrepreneur Initial Deal Proposal- Proposed $ Amount; Entrepreneur Initial Deal 
Proposal- Proposed Percentage of Equity for $; Accepted Deal- $ Amount; Accepted 
Deal- Percentage of Equity for $; CALCULATION: Entrepreneur Initial Deal Proposal 
Valuation $; CALCULATION: Accepted Deal Valuation $; and CALCULATION: Deal 
Structure Ratio. 
Focusing on the theoretical model in Figure 1, the following variables are discussed 
further: 
Venture Quality Signal – Human Capital (Independent Variable) 
 Human capital is generally defined as the impactful resources that the 
entrepreneurial team brings to a new venture based on education and experiences.  The 
greater this resource base, the better equipped the new venture is to compete against 
existing firms.  Having an entrepreneurial team can be a positive signal for investment as 
venture capitalists look at opportunities with top management teams when evaluating 
opportunities (Bachher & Guild, 1996; Muzyka, Birley, & Leleux, 1996).  Top 
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management team legitimacy is a signal that has an effect on valuation as investors 
perceive it as an indicator of economic potential of a company (Cohen & Dean, 2005).  
Businesses that are run by entrepreneurial teams can bring a more “diversified and skilled 
resource base” with a larger network of business contacts as well as increased firm 
legitimacy (Lagazio & Querci, 2018, p. 319; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994).  
More diversity in functional and educational backgrounds of top management teams 
signal quality of an IPO to investors and is shown to result in greater capital raised in an 
IPO (Zimmerman, 2008).  In larger firms, gender and racial diversity signals have been 
studied.  Gender diversity signaled in top management teams in large firms can lead to 
better performance in IPOs (Welbourne, Cycyota, & Ferrante, 2007).  Racial diversity 
reputation is shown to have a positive effect on book-to-market equity and diversity of 
leadership is shown to have a U-shaped relationship on book-to-market equity showing 
that the positive effect comes in at a point after an initial decline (Roberson & Park, 
2007).   
In addition, team size has been shown to be positively related to company growth 
(Federico, Rabetino, & Kantis, 2012).  More individuals bring greater resources to the 
new venture.  Top management team experience and skills are often used by venture 
capitalists as a predictor of future performance (Baum & Silverman, 2004).  Some of 
these skills come from the education of the team members.  Education level of the 
founding team can be an important human capital signal predicting performance (Cooper, 
Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994) and funding (Hsu, 2007).  Benefits of experience can 
come from several angles.  Industry-specific experience is shown to be an important 
signal to venture capital investment (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  Prior industry experience 
79 
 
implies “that founders possess 1) tacit knowledge about customers and industry success 
factors, 2) experience with understanding opportunities in that industry, and 3) social ties 
with important stakeholders” which leads to an understanding of marketplace needs (Ko 
& McKelvie, 2018, p. 441; Kotha & George, 2012).  Prior founding experience has also 
been shown to have a positive signaling effect when trying to obtain financing, especially 
when individuals were successful in the past (Hsu, 2007).  Even if the entrepreneur did 
not start a business in the past, he or she may have had parents that were entrepreneurs.  
Having parents who owned a business has shown to increase firm survival, likely due to 
the fact that the entrepreneur would be more aware of and prepared for challenges related 
to business ownership (Cooper et al., 1994).  Education, experience, and skills are tools 
that can help build an entrepreneur’s reputation.  Founding member reputation is a human 
capital signal that is often used to predict viability (Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2012; Ko & 
McKelvie, 2018).  A dictionary identifying words for these related human capital signals 
will be created for DICTION and a quantity count will be used to obtain the number of 
human capital signals used during the business pitch.  The text of the entrepreneur’s 
business pitch will be the data source used for DICTION. 
Venture Quality Signal – Social Capital (Independent Variable) 
 Business alliances are important for companies to gain access to needed resources 
(Ahlers et al., 2015; Baum & Silverman, 2004).  “In the context of early-stage financing, 
third party affiliations (venture development organizations) signal investors in two ways, 
by (1) endorsing the quality of the startup and founding team, and (2) communicating to 
investors that the third party will provide key substantive benefits to the startup” 
(Plummer, Allison, & Connelly, 2016 p. 6; Lee, Pollock, & Jin, 2011).  Private firms with 
80 
 
prominent business partners are shown to go to an initial public offering (IPO) faster and 
have higher valuations at IPO (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). 
Through affiliation, prestigious executives and directors are shown to have a 
positive linear effect on the value of a young firm (Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 
2010).  Early stage ventures heading for an IPO attempt to legitimize their company by 
adding well-known leaders to their boards of directors (Certo, 2003; Filatotchev & 
Bishop, 2002).  A large board structure with prestigious directors sends positive signals 
to investors in an IPO (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001).  In addition, CEO’s with “more 
external directorships may signal greater social capital and thus may be perceived as 
being more credible and trustworthy” (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009, p. 705).  Other signals, 
like board diversity signal characteristics of social values within the firm (Miller & del 
Carmen Triana, 2009). 
Alliances also have an effect on mortality rates.  Relationships are shown to have 
a positive effect on firm survival when linked with institutions of greater legitimacy 
(Baum & Oliver, 1991; Baum & Silverman, 2004).  Firms that have connections with 
legitimate firms such as high-profile investors or venture capitalists signal to other 
stakeholders their acceptance as being considered legitimate (Fisher, Kuratko, 
Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Plummer et al. 2016).  There are benefits of finding 
alliance partners early that are well connected and have large networks themselves.  
These networks also aid in gaining useful information that isn’t always available to the 
public (Ahlers et al., 2015).  By aligning with such partners such as prominent investors, 
new ventures are often able to expand their network to include those additional 
connections increasing the overall size of their network enabling better access to 
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resources (Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009).  Financial commitments set forth by partners 
such as venture capitalists signal that the company will have access to resources thus be 
able to survive longer (Jain & Kini, 2000).  A dictionary identifying words for these 
related social capital signals will be created for DICTION and a quantity count will be 
used to obtain the number of social capital signals used during the business pitch.  The 
text of the entrepreneur’s business pitch will be the data source used for DICTION. 
Venture Quality Signal – Intellectual Capital (Independent Variable) 
New ventures that create innovations often have difficulty in explaining both the 
appropriateness or showing the feasibility of their ideas (Audretsch, Bönte, & 
Mahagaonkar, 2012).  In some industries, start-ups with patents and prototypes are more 
likely to obtain equity financing as it shows feasibility to investors (Audretsch et al., 
2012).  At times, working prototypes are beneficial to tangibly show a concept to 
potential investors.  Entrepreneurs that can formalize their ideas and designs are better 
able to explain their ideas that potentially would not be understood by investors (Ahlers 
et al., 2015; Cohen & Lemley, 2001).  By patenting a product or process, entrepreneurs 
can attempt to obtain a competitive advantage.  Entrepreneurs that are able to secure a 
patent for their innovations in products or processes are able to obtain 20-year monopoly 
protections (Baum & Silverman, 2004).  Firms with patents are shown to be able to 
obtain other growth resources such as investment capital and partners (Baum & 
Silverman, 2004).  Likewise, a study of biotech firms with patent pending applications 
were positively correlated with chance of survival (Silverman & Baum, 2002).  “Patent 
ownership can serve somewhat of a deterrent against future market entrants, which could 
also be interpreted as a positive signal of a company’s strength and quality (Ahlers et al., 
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2015).  A dictionary identifying words for these related intellectual capital signals will be 
created for DICTION and a quantity count will be used to obtain the number of 
intellectual capital signals used during the business pitch.  The text of the entrepreneur’s 
business pitch will be the data source used for DICTION. 
Venture Quality Signal – Financial Capital (Independent Variable) 
Firms that can reveal a profitable future in a business pitch sends positive signals 
to potential investors (Connelly et al., 2011).  New ventures pitch investors typically at 
some point between their formation stage and the early growth stage.  A new venture that 
has generated revenue from selling their product begins to show market adoption 
removing some of the uncertainty on whether or not customers will buy the product or 
service.  A dictionary identifying words for these related financial capital signals, such as 
variants of the word revenue, will be created for DICTION and a quantity count will be 
used to obtain the number of financial capital signals used during the business pitch.  The 
text of the entrepreneur’s business pitch will be the data source used for DICTION. 
Signal Characteristics – Cost (Moderator) 
 The characteristic of a costly signal is that it prevents imitation by those of lower 
quality.  Costly signals are those that are considered difficult to obtain.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, this "cost" can be in different forms, not just monetarily.  A signaler may exert 
energy or time towards obtaining a signal.  For example, and entrepreneur's education or 
industry experience, a firm developing meaningful business relationships, or obtaining 
significant intellectual capital have costs associated to them.  A dictionary for related 
costly signal characteristics related to money, energy, or time will be created for 
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DICTION and a quantity count will be used to obtain the number of costly signals used 
during the business pitch.  The text of the entrepreneur’s business pitch will be the data 
source used for DICTION. 
Signal Characteristics – Honesty (Moderator) 
Signal honesty describes the situation in which the signaler is truthful in 
possessing the attributes of the signal.  Busenitz et al. (2005) refers to this honesty as 
signal veracity.  Investors that are putting money at risk when funding new ventures are 
concerned about the veracity of the entrepreneur during their pitch.  As such, when 
investors question that veracity of the entrepreneur's claims during the business pitch or 
their intent for investment, the intended positive strength of the signal can be reduced or 
have a negative effect on the overall business pitch.  A dictionary for words related to an 
investor questioning the veracity of signals from a business pitch will be created for 
DICTION and a quantity count will be used.  Unlike the others, the text of the potential 
investors will be the data source used for DICTION. 
Negotiating Position – Alternatives (Mediator) 
 One may posit that quality business pitches will drive a higher number of 
potential investors in an opportunity.  With investment opportunities being presented to 
them regularly, investors generally have available alternatives.  However, market 
conditions, the desire to be active in certain industries, and/or an investor’s interest in a 
specific entrepreneur’s business opportunity may dictate investment actions. Promising 
business opportunities are desirable to investors. “Return on investment is generally 
considered the primary, if not sole, motivation for (angel) investors” (Morrissette, 2007, 
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p. 60). There is the potential scarcity of ones that are most desirable and this may lead to 
increased interest by additional investors. In situations in which there are multiple bidders 
pursing a business opportunity, investor FoMO may kick-in as one does not want to be on 
the sidelines while a competing investor wins an investment opportunity that is signaling 
desirable growth potential. The number of interested investors in a business represent 
financing alternatives (or lack of financing alternatives if minimal or no interest) for the 
entrepreneur.  Supply and demand dynamics is likely a function of the interest.  Fear, 
specifically FoMO, could be a contributing factor.  If fear did not exist, investors would 
likely place their best offer and not be concerned about losing out to competing offers.  In 
other words, investors would let their offers “speak for themselves” without further 
justifying the offers. However, in many cases, investors make active efforts, often taking 
either offensive and/or defensive approaches, in the delivery and positioning of their 
offers.  If the FoMO emotion begins to increase within an investor in a sealed-bid 
process, an investor may exhibit observable actions which are similar to those observed 
by the investors on the television show Shark Tank. Such observable investor behaviors 
that may be seen include: (1) Investor converts to “selling” themselves to the 
entrepreneur, instead of vice versa; (2) Investor criticizes competing investor(s) and their 
bid(s); (3) Investor attempts to influence entrepreneur by bringing up significant 
challenges that entrepreneur will face and how it will be more challenging without their 
involvement; and/or (4) Investor fears a bidding war thus attempts to collude with 
another investor to team up together versus fighting one another.  Though most 
entrepreneurs are funded through private negotiations, these examples of investor 
behaviors still occur in private sealed-bid negotiations making Shark Tank a reasonable 
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proxy of what occurs privately between entrepreneurs and investors.  These dynamics are 
examples of how an entrepreneur’s BATNA can be strengthened through the 
characteristics of the business explained during the business pitch.  Explained differently, 
specific content from the business pitch signals a quality investment opportunity and 
leads to increased interest. 
For the purpose of this analysis, the entrepreneur’s negotiating position strength 
(BATNA) will be operationalized by recording the number of interested investors 
(alternatives).  For each Shark Tank business pitch, the number of interested investors 
that present an offer will be recorded.  For each business pitch, the number of interested 
investors will range from 1 to 5 as this is the number of investors listening to the pitch 
that can make an investment proposal.  While the number of offers could be used as the 
measure, I believe that the number of interested investors is a better measure of strength 
as investors occasionally team up to provide an offer as a way to strengthen their offer to 
an entrepreneur.  Looking at the extremes, a single offer presented to an entrepreneur 
with five investors bringing a diverse background of resources is much more valuable 
than an offer presented by a single investor.  The entrepreneur may be able to strike a 
deal with any one of the five (or combination thereof) – if there is mutual interest in 
working together.  Thus, the BATNA position strength will be measured by the number 






Deal Structure (Dependent Variable) 
 The unit of analysis will be the valuation that the entrepreneur receives from a 
negotiated deal as a result of a business investment pitch and corresponding negotiation.  
A calculation will need to be made in order to compute the implied valuation from the 
entrepreneur and the investor to analyze the bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread is defined 
as the difference between the valuation that the entrepreneur “asks” and what the investor 
“bids.”  This spread shows the difference of opinion between the entrepreneur and 
investor related to the company’s equity valuation. The implied valuations are the result 
of dividing the dollar amount proposed (or asked) to be invested by the percentage of the 
company’s equity desired (or offered) for this amount of funding.  Specifically, the 
dependent variable of the valuation will be a ratio with 1.0 representing that the 
entrepreneur received full valuation.  For example, an entrepreneur receiving only half of 
the desired implied valuation would have a valuation ratio of 0.50. The asking price is 
designated as the meaningful reference point while calculating the percentage difference 
between the entrepreneur’s asking valuation and the amount received (bid) allows for 
comparison at different negotiating and operating positions.  Only the “ask” and the final 
negotiated investment dollar amount and percentage will be recorded for the business 
pitches. 
Analysis 
After the data is collected from both completing the CATA and entering data into 
the spreadsheet as a result of watching the Shark Tank videos, I will take the consolidated 
data and analyze it using hierarchical regression. The model in Figure 1 will be analyzed 
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to see if signals lead to higher valuations (better valuation deal structure).  If these 
hypotheses are confirmed, then an entrepreneur can potentially understand the signals 
that can drive improved valuation and thus will be able to position their business prior to 









In this study, video pitch content was transcribed, computer-aided text analysis 
dictionaries were developed, and observation data was collected to perform a quantitative 
analysis related to venture quality signals in business pitches, negotiation alternatives, 
and deal results.  In addition, qualitative survey data was collected as an additional source 
for exploration into the research questions.  To present and explain the components of 
this study in an effective manner, this chapter is presented in five parts.  In the first, the 
steps taken to develop the linguistics word-based dictionaries to operationalize venture 
quality signals is explained.  In addition, details are provided as to how the independent 
and dependent variables were obtained.  In the second, descriptive statistics for the data 
sample are presented and discussed.  In the third section, to answer the research questions 
of whether or not during an investment pitch, signals of high venture quality as a result of 
human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and financial capital positively affect 
the number of investor alternatives of a new venture, the quantitative analysis using 
Poisson regression is presented.  In the third section, the moderation analysis answers the 
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research question on whether or not during an investment pitch, if the positive 
relationship between high venture quality signals of a new venture and the number of 
investor alternatives is moderated by the signal characteristics of cost and honesty.  
Finally, in the fifth section, a mediation analysis answers the research question of 
whether or not during an investment pitch, the positive relationship between high venture 
quality signals of a new venture and the investment valuation received is mediated by the 
number of investor alternatives available to the new venture. 
Part I: Development of Word-based Dictionaries and Data Preparation 
As part of the computer-aided text analysis (CATA) process (Short et al., 2010), 
to operationalization the venture quality signals (human capital, social capital, intellectual 
capital, and financial capital), linguistic word-based dictionaries were created so that the 
computer software program, DICTION, could generate frequency counts specific to each 
venture quality type. As mentioned previously in this paper, using the CATA 
methodology, verbal pitches must be converted to text so that DICTION can process 
content and generate word count quantities to be used in further quantitative analysis.  
The creation of the dictionaries involved a number of steps. 
The first step required the acquisition of the Shark Tank videos that had been used 
previously in a related analysis of business pitches.  These videos consist of segments of 
entrepreneur business pitches that were cut prior to the Shark Tank panel investment 
decisions.  By using these segments versus the entire pitches, the dataset is standardized 
as the entrepreneurs have relative control of the business pitch presentation and 
discussion.  This dataset consists of 294 videos pitches that were individually saved as 
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video (.wmv) files.  Initially, a transcription service by Amazon was evaluated but 
rejected as the transcription results were poor with incorrect translation and spelling 
errors.  In addition, labels were not placed for who was communicating specific words, 
an important requirement to accurately run the analysis within DICTION to isolated 
analysis to the entrepreneur’s spoken words and not investors or television narrator 
within the video clips.  Another company, TranscriptionStar (iSource Solutions Inc.), that 
specializes in transcribing video clips to text was evaluated through a similar trial.  The 
results were excellent with word-for-word match and correct spelling in the transcription.  
In addition, the desired label of the communicating individual present.  All 294 videos 
were transcribed by this service provider with each transcription returned in an individual 
Microsoft Word document labeled by pitch number. 
A project was created within DICTION to where all the Microsoft Word pitch 
documents could be analyzed in a single processing.  Within DICTION, the heading 
information was removed leaving just the spoken text along with the speaker’s name next 
to each line of communication.  DICTION has a feature that allows for Internal Author 
Analysis, meaning that specific words can be highlighted so that the analysis will be 
isolated to the highlighted words.  The transcribed text that is highlighted using the 
Internal Author Analysis feature within DICTION allows for analysis that can 
differentiate between different speakers.  An Internal Author Analysis code was created 
for “Entrepreneur” meaning that within each pitch only the spoken (highlighted) words of 
the entrepreneur would be analyzed.  Each line of an entrepreneur’s spoken text was 
reviewed and highlighted in all of the 294 business pitch Word documents. 
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To formulate the user specific dictionaries that are run against content, the method 
requires a series of steps involving both deductive and inductive processes.  As part of the 
deductive content validity process, working definitions were created for each of the 
venture quality signals based on literature.  These definitions are shown in Table 3 below. 
 







A list of keywords that correspond to these definitions were developed including 
one to three closely related words in which synonyms would be gathered to formulate 
each dictionary (McKenny, Short, & Payne, 2012).  Previously validated scales provided 
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insight for word suggestions of several of the qualities (Short et al., 2010).  Rodale’s 
(1978) The Synonym Finder was suggested and used to create a comprehensive list of 
related words (Short et al., 2010).  This process was similarly completed for all fourteen 
venture quality signals. 
The fourteen individual venture signal lists were reviewed by three expert coders 
where each coder was asked to mark words that should be excluded if the specific word 
did not reflect the meaning of the related venture quality signal.  The selection process 
then involved combining the results of each coder.  Since each word required that the 
three coders to “vote” on words to be excluded if believed the word did not reflect the 
meaning of the related venture quality signal, each word had between zero and three 
marks for exclusion.  If a word received two or more marks for exclusion (representing a 
majority vote for exclusion), the word was removed from the dictionary.  Across the 
fourteen dictionaries, the interrater reliability coefficient for the deductive list was found 
to be 0.73.   
Next, an inductive content analysis was completed.  A linguistic software tool 
known as AntConc was used for this process step. All the content that was highlighted for 
Internal Author Analysis within DICTION was copied into a single Microsoft Word 
document for processing.  This represented all the spoken words of the entrepreneurs 
throughout the 294 business pitches.  Within AntConc, an analysis was completed by 
creating a master wordlist ranking the usage of words while providing a quantity count.  
The list was reviewed for words to be considered for inclusion in the dictionaries which 
were not part of the initial deductive list.  DICTION does not use wildcards for truncated 
words.  In order to make sure that related words would be captured in the analysis, the 
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inductive list was combined and sorted with the deductive list so that related words could 
be reviewed by the coders to decide if they should be added to the dictionaries.  The three 
coders similarly marked words as done in the deductive process step, to be excluded if 
the coder felt that the meaning did not reflect the venture quality signal.   
Specific to the inductive list, across the fourteen dictionaries, the interrater reliability 
coefficient was found to be 0.88.  Finally, the deductive and inductive lists were 
combined for each of the fourteen venture quality signal dictionaries.  Across all fourteen 
dictionaries, the combined list interrater reliability coefficient was found to be 0.83.  Each 
of the fourteen dictionaries were separately uploaded into DICTION to enable raw word 
quantity counts for each venture quality signal. 
 In order to operationalize BATNA, I manually recorded negotiation details from 
the Shark Tank videos.  BATNA was operationalized by recording the number of active 
investors presenting offers after an entrepreneur’s pitch.  These offers represent financing 
alternatives for the entrepreneur.  A total of 294 business pitches across six Shark Tank 
seasons were coded for deal term and negotiation specifics.  The information gathered for 
each pitch included the season and episode identification, the business description, the 
amount of money that the entrepreneur was asking and the equity percentage being 
offered in exchange for the investment, the agreed upon amount of money that the 
entrepreneur was receiving and the equity percentage being received in exchange for the 
investment if a deal was accepted, the number of investors involved in making offers on 
the business (funding alternatives), a yes/no on whether or not a deal was agreed upon, 
and the names of the specific investors involved in hearing the pitch and whether or not 
they presented an offer to the entrepreneur.  Revenue details were attempted to be 
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collected but since entrepreneurs were not required to present revenue details as part of 
their pitches, the information was not present or in a format that could not be used in the 
analysis thus it was not collected beyond the fourth season to be used in the analysis.  
Each business pitch was presented to five investors, thus the number of investor 
alternatives ranged from zero to five.  As part of the show’s format, Shark Tank uses 
different investors on their investor panel.  In the dataset used, there was a total of eleven 
different investors with seven of them being considered “regulars” and the balance being 
special guests with minimal appearances. For season one through four, a summary 
containing all the deal term and negotiation specifics was available on the ABC television 
network website.  For seasons five and six, I watched the full episodes to record the deal 
term and negotiation specifics.  Several calculations were completed from the obtained 
data.  The first reflects the asking implied valuation which was calculated by taking the 
amount of money the entrepreneur was seeking divided by the percentage of equity in the 
company that the investor would receive for the investment.  The second calculation 
represents the deal valuation.  Similarly, the deal valuation was calculated by the amount 
of money the entrepreneur received divided by the percentage of equity in the company 
that the investor received for the investment when the deal was agreed upon.  A third 
calculation was made which divided the deal valuation by the asking implied valuation.  
This represents the ratio of valuation the entrepreneur received after investment 
compared to what they initial requested.  This ratio serves as a proxy of the negotiation 
success with a higher ratio being considered being more successful. 
 A third data source was needed for the analysis to evaluate signal strengths.  To 
understand the effects of the hypothesized moderators of signal cost and signal honesty, a 
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survey was conducted.  IRB approval was granted for the study.  To obtain signal cost 
and signal honesty weights, a survey was created on Qualtrics and sent to five individuals 
experienced in business pitches.  Four survey responses were received, representing an 
80% response rate.  Using a Likert scale (1-7), respondents were asked to provide their 
opinion of signal cost (1 = Low Cost; 7 = High Cost) and signal honesty (1 = Low 
Honesty; 7 = High Honesty) for each of the 14 signal types.  The mean of the four 
respondents were used for the weights that used in the interaction calculations.  The mean 
score for a signal cost variable was 4.6, ranging between 2.75 and 5.5.   The mean score 
for a signal honesty variable was 5.0, ranging between 3.75 and 6.25.  The interclass 
correlation coefficient was only 0.304 thus there was low interrater reliability between 
the four individuals completing the survey. 
A master spreadsheet was created combining the Shark Tank deal terms and 
negotiation specifics, the results of the DICTION word counts for each of the fourteen 
venture quality signals, and the mean scores from the 14-signal cost and 14-signal 
honesty survey questions.  Five pitches were excluded from the dataset as the negotiated 
deals were not direct investments for equity which would create incomplete or inaccurate 
calculations.  To standardize the signals across pitches, the raw scores were divided by 
the total word count within each pitch.  In addition, composite venture quality signals 
(human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and financial capital) were created for 
evaluating the research questions.  These composites were created by adding all the 
human capital signal raw scores, all the social capital signal raw scores, all the 
intellectual capital signal raw scores, and all the financial capital signal raw scores and 
dividing each by the total word count for standardization.  There was a range of 0.041 to 
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0.185 for the ratio of Human Capital signals, a range of 0.007 to 0.076 for the ratio of 
Social Capital signals, a range of 0.006 to 0.081 for the ratio of Intellectual Capital, and a 
range of 0.012 to 0.083 for the ratio of Financial Capital signals.  Similarly, for use in 
evaluating the effects of moderation of signal strength, weighted composites were 
developed by multiply each of the fourteen venture signal qualities by their 
corresponding mean survey strength for the cost characteristic (and honesty completed 
separately) and dividing each by the total word count which represent the interactions to 
evaluate moderation. 
Finally, three control variables were added to the spreadsheet.  These variables 
include the 2-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) codes, a variable describing 
the visual human capital signal of entrepreneurial team size (1 = one entrepreneur, 2 = 
two entrepreneurs, 3 = more than two entrepreneurs), and a variable describing the visual 
human capital signal of gender diversity (1 = single male entrepreneur, 2 = single female 
entrepreneur, 3 = greater than one entrepreneur and all male, 4 = greater than one 
entrepreneur and all female, and 5 = greater than one entrepreneur and mixed genders).  
The spreadsheet was uploaded into SPSS. 
Part II: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics are associated with the deal particulars and venture 
quality signals of human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and financial capital.  
Composites were created by adding all the human capital signal raw scores, all the social 
capital signal raw scores, all the intellectual capital signal raw scores, and all the financial 
capital signal raw scores and dividing each by the total word count.  For the human 
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capital composite, the six components of human capital serving as proxies consisting of 
1] Top management team legitimacy and reputation (e.g., Cohen & Dean, 2005; Ebbers 
& Wijnberg, 2012; Ko & McKelvie, 2018), 2] Entrepreneurial team make-up (e.g., Baum 
& Silverman, 2004; Lagazio & Querci, 2018; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; 
Zimmerman, 2008; Federico, Rabetino, & Kantis, 2012), 3] Gender and racial diversity 
(e.g., Welbourne, Cycyota, & Ferrante, 2007; Roberson & Park, 2007), 4] Industry 
knowledge and experience (e.g., Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Ko & McKelvie, 2018,; Kotha 
& George, 2012), 5] Prior Founding Experience (e.g., Hsu, 2007), and 6] Education (e.g., 
Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Hsu, 2007 ) raw scores were added and divided 
by the total word count for standardization.  For the social capital composite, the three 
components of social capital serving as proxies consisting of 1] New ventures with third-
party alliances or affiliations (e.g., Plummer, Allison, & Connelly, 2016; Lee, Pollock, & 
Jin, 2011; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), 2] Large board diversity (e.g., Miller & del 
Carmen Triana, 2009), and 3] Existing high-profile investors or venture capitalists (e.g., 
Fisher, Kuratko, Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Plummer et al. 2016) raw scores were 
added and divided by the total word count for standardization.  For the intellectual capital 
composite, the two components of intellectual capital serving as proxies consisting of 1] 
Patents and prototypes (e.g., Audretsch, Bönte, & Mahagaonkar, 2012; Baum & 
Silverman, 2004) and 2] Business plans (e.g., Mason & Stark, 2004) raw scores were 
added and divided by the total word count for standardization.  Finally, for the financial 
capital composite, the three components of financial capital serving as proxies consisting 
of 1] Meaningful company financial projections (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015), 2] 
Management's certification of financial statements (e.g., Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), and 
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3] Positive industry growth rate projections (e.g., MacMillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985; 
McDougall, Covin, Robinson, & Herron, 1994) raw scores were added and divided by 
the total word count for standardization. 
For all 2891 pitches, the means and standard deviations for the four proxies of 
venture quality signals of human capital (M = 0.1008, SD = 0.0225), social capital (M = 
0.0351, SD = 0.0120), intellectual capital (M = 0.0307, SD = 0.0116), and financial 
capital (M = 0.0336, SD = 0.0118), were calculated.  Spearman’s correlation was used to 
identify significant correlations and are shown in Table 4.  One noticeable relationship is 
that deal alternatives are significantly correlated with deal ratio.  Human capital signals 
are significantly correlated with social, intellectual, and financial capital signals.  Social 
and intellectual capital are significantly correlated and intellectual and financial capital 
are significantly correlated with one another. 
 
Similarly, the means, standard deviations and correlations were explored 
specifically for the pitches that received deals (Deal = 1) and are shown in Table 5. For 
these cases (N = 140), the means and standard deviations for the four proxies of venture 
quality signals of human capital (M = 0.1008, SD = 0.0207), social capital (M = 0.0343, 
                                                           
1 The quantity of initial business pitches reviewed before exclusions was 294. 
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SD = 0.0116), intellectual capital (M = 0.0304, SD = 0.0110), and financial capital (M = 
0.0328, SD = 0.0108), were calculated.  Again, Spearman’s correlation was used to 
identify significant correlations for the two-tailed test and are shown in Table 5.  Human 
capital signals have a significant negative correlation with deal ratio. Human capital 
signals continue to be significantly correlated with social, intellectual, and financial 
capital signals.  Similarly, social and intellectual capital are significantly correlated and 
intellectual and financial capital are significantly correlated with one another. 
 
Part III: Regression Analysis of Signals and Alternatives 
To identify which of the independent variables impact the dependent variable 
(alternatives), the Poisson multiple regression model was utilized.  This method of 
regression models the log of the expected alternative count as a function of the signal 
predictor variables.  IBM SPSS Statistics Version 25 was used for the statistical analysis. 
In the first analysis, all 289 pitches were evaluated.  To evaluate whether all the 
independent variables improve the model over the intercept-only model which would 
consist of no independent variables, the Omnibus Test is utilized as part of the Poisson 
regression analysis.  Table 6 shows that when comparing the fitted model against the 
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intercept-only model, the model is significant (p = 0.008), meaning that the model 
improves with the independent variables as it generates a statistically significant model. 
 
Table 7 shows the statistical significance for each of the independent variables, 
including the overall effect of categorical variables.  Variables which have high Wald 
Chi-Square values suggest that the coefficients describe the log(Alternatives) model well.  
Taking the results of the regression, the regression equation for our analysis can be 
written using the ß coefficients.  The independent variables of Human Capital Signals 
[Verbal] (ß = -3.084), Social Capital Signals [Verbal] (ß = -8.671), Intellectual Capital 
Signals [Verbal] (ß = -1.524), and Financial Capital Signals [Verbal] (ß = 6.054) are 
shown not to be statistically significant.  Standard Industrial Classification [SIC], Human 
Capital - Team Size [Visual], and Human Capital - Gender Diversity [Visual] are 






Based on the analysis (N = 289), the results show that the four independent 
variables, Human Capital Signals [Verbal], Social Capital Signals [Verbal], Intellectual 
Capital Signals [Verbal], and Financial Capital Signals [Verbal], do not show a 
significant impact on deal alternatives thus we did not find support for any of these four 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: During an investment pitch, signals of high venture quality as a 
result of human capital positively affect the number of investor alternatives of a 
new venture. 
Hypothesis 1b: During an investment pitch, signals of high venture quality as a 
result of social capital positively affect the number of investor alternatives of a 
new venture. 
Hypothesis 1c: During an investment pitch, signals of high venture quality as a 
result of intellectual capital positively affect the number of investor alternatives of 
a new venture. 
Hypothesis 1d: During an investment pitch, signals of high venture quality as a 
result of financial capital positively affect the number of investor alternatives of a 
new venture. 
An additional analysis was conducted to see if the venture quality signals in the pitches 
that resulted in a deal (DEAL = 1, N = 140) were significant.  The Omnibus Test was 
similarly utilized as part of this Poisson regression analysis.  Table 8 shows that when 
comparing the fitted model against the intercept-only model, the model is not significant 
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(p = 0.955), meaning that the model does not improve with the independent variables as it 
does not generate a statistically significant model. 
 
Similarly, Table 9 shows the statistical significance for each of the independent 
variables, including the overall effect of categorical variables.  The independent variables 
of Human Capital Signals [Verbal] (ß = -3.533), Social Capital Signals [Verbal] (ß = -
3.576), Intellectual Capital Signals [Verbal] (ß = -8.788), and Financial Capital Signals 
[Verbal] (ß = 9.972) are shown not to be statistically significant as are the control 
variables of Standard Industrial Classification [SIC], Human Capital - Team Size 




Based on the analysis of just the pitches that received accepted deals (N = 140), 
the results show that the four independent variables, Human Capital Signals [Verbal], 
Social Capital Signals [Verbal], Intellectual Capital Signals [Verbal], and Financial 
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Capital Signals [Verbal], do not show a significant impact on deal alternatives thus we 
again did not find support for hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d. 
Part IV: Moderation Analysis of Signals Characteristics 
Cost and honesty are potential moderating variables that could alter alternatives 
based on their strengths.  Strengths of cost and honesty signals were obtained through 
surveys as described earlier in this report.  The mean of the four respondents were used 
for the weights that used in the interaction calculations.  The first moderating 
characteristic that was analyzed was cost.  Interaction variables were created for Human 
Capital Signals [Verbal] = HC_WC, Social Capital Signals [Verbal] = SC_WC, 
Intellectual Capital Signals [Verbal] = IC_WC, and Financial Capital Signals [Verbal] = 
FC_WC by taking each variable and multiplying it by their corresponding mean cost 
weight from the survey. 
As in Part III, to identify which of these variables impact the dependent variable 
(alternatives) when cost is added as a moderator, the Poisson multiple regression model 
was utilized.  In the first analysis, all 289 pitches were evaluated.  The Omnibus Test was 
utilized as part of the Poisson regression analysis and yielded similar results as in Part III.  
Table 10 shows that when comparing the fitted model against the intercept-only model, 
the model is significant (p = 0.008), meaning that the model improves with the 




Similar to Part III, variables which have high Wald Chi-Square values suggest 
that the coefficients describe the log(Alternatives) model well.  Likewise, taking the 
results of the regression, the regression equation for our analysis can be written using the 
ß coefficients.  Table 11 shows that the independent variables of Human Capital Signals 
[Verbal] x Cost (ß = -0.641), Social Capital Signals [Verbal] x Cost (ß = -1.889), 
Intellectual Capital Signals [Verbal] x Cost (ß = -0.308), and Financial Capital Signals 
[Verbal] x Cost (ß = 1.719) are shown not to be statistically significant.  Standard 
Industrial Classification [SIC], Human Capital - Team Size [Visual], and Human Capital 
- Gender Diversity [Visual] are independent control variables and are statistically 






Repeating the previous steps when honesty is added as a moderator, when 
evaluating all 289 pitches the Omnibus Test yielded similar results.  Table 12 shows that 
when comparing the fitted model against the intercept-only model, the model is 
significant (p = 0.007), meaning that the model improves with the independent variables 
as it generates a statistically significant model. 
 
Table 13 shows that the independent variables of Human Capital Signals [Verbal] 
x Honesty (ß = -0.701), Social Capital Signals [Verbal] x Honesty (ß = -1.517), 
Intellectual Capital Signals [Verbal] x Honesty (ß = -0.244), and Financial Capital 
Signals [Verbal] x Honesty (ß = 1.225) are shown not to be statistically significant.  
Standard Industrial Classification [SIC], Human Capital - Team Size [Visual], and 
Human Capital - Gender Diversity [Visual] are independent control variables and are 






Based on the analysis (N = 289), the results showed minimal change when each 
cost and honesty were added as moderators.  The proposed moderators do not show a 
significant impact on deal alternatives thus we do not find support for the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: During an investment pitch, the positive relationship between high 
venture quality signals of a new venture and the number of investor alternatives is 
moderated by the signal characteristics of cost and honesty. 
As in Part III, an additional analysis was conducted to see if the results differ 
when just the successful pitches were analyzed (DEAL = 1, N = 140).  The Omnibus Test 
was utilized and Table 14 shows that when comparing the fitted model against the 
intercept-only model, the model again is not significant (p = 0.959), meaning that the 
model does not improve with the independent variables as it does not generate a 
statistically significant model. 
 
Table 15 shows that the independent variables of Human Capital Signals [Verbal] 
x Cost (ß = -0.694), Social Capital Signals [Verbal] x Cost (ß = -0.930), Intellectual 
Capital Signals [Verbal] x Cost (ß = -1.850), and Financial Capital Signals [Verbal] x 
Cost (ß = 2.697) are shown not to be statistically significant as are the control variables of 
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Standard Industrial Classification [SIC], Human Capital - Team Size [Visual], and 




Repeating the previous steps when honesty is added as a moderator to evaluate 
the 140 pitches, the Omnibus Test yielded similar results in that the model again is not 
significant (p = 0.960), meaning that the model does not improve with the independent 
variables as it does not generate a statistically significant model (see Table 16). 
 
Table 17 shows that the independent variables of Human Capital Signals [Verbal] 
x Honesty (ß = -0.694), Social Capital Signals [Verbal] x Honesty (ß = -0.639), 
Intellectual Capital Signals [Verbal] x Honesty (ß = -1.936), and Financial Capital 
Signals [Verbal] x Honesty (ß = 2.027) are shown not to be statistically significant as are 
the control variables of Standard Industrial Classification [SIC], Human Capital - Team 






Based on the analysis (N = 140), the results showed minimal change when each 
cost and honesty were added as moderators, which was similar to the results of the full 
data set, thus again no support for the hypothesis. 
Part V: Mediation Analysis 
In order to run the mediation tests to see if during an investment pitch the number of 
investor alternatives available to the new venture mediates the relationship between 
venture quality signals and the investment valuation received by the entrepreneur, I 
downloaded and installed Andrew F. Hayes' PROCESS Macro version 3.3 from 
www.processmacro.org/download.html for mediation analysis using SPSS.  Appendix A 
of Hayes' (2018) Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process 
Analysis confirmed that Model 4 resembles the mediation model shown in Figure 2. 
Evaluating mediation using the model in Figure 2, there is not a significant 
relationship between venture quality signals and deal structure (ß = -0.8612) or 
negotiating position (ß = -1.5936).  The analysis does show that there is a significant 
positive relationship between negotiating position (alternatives) and the deal structure (ß 
= 0.1886).  The analysis also shows the presence of alternatives does reduce the effect of 
venture quality signals on deal structure (ß = -0.8612 without ALTS present and ß= -
0.5606 with ALTS present).  The indirect effect of venture quality signals on deal 
structure is ß = -0.3005, C.I. -0.9618, 0.4415.  In summary, there is not support for the 
hypothesis that investor alternatives available to the new venture mediates the 
relationship between venture quality signals and the investment valuation received by the 




As in the previous parts, I separately looked at cases which resulted in deals (N = 
140).  Figure 3 shows the model and results.  There is not a significant relationship 
between venture quality signals and deal structure (ß = -1.3551) or negotiating position (ß 
= -4.9067).  When looking at this subgroup, the analysis does not show that there is a 
significant relationship between negotiating position (alternatives) and the deal structure 
(ß = 0.0427).  The analysis does show a slight reduction of the effect of venture quality 
signals on deal structure (ß = -1.3551 without ALTS present and ß = -1.1454 with ALTS 
present).  The indirect effect of venture quality signals on deal structure is ß = -0.2097, 
C.I. -0.6938, 0.1379.  Again, there is not support for the hypothesis that investor 
alternatives available to the new venture mediates the relationship between venture 
quality signals and the investment valuation received by the entrepreneur when looking at 
















The underlying objectives of this research study are to (1) understand how signals 
of high venture quality as a result of human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, and 
financial capital affect the number of investor alternatives a new venture receives based 
on the content of an entrepreneur’s investment pitch, (2) understand how the signal 
characteristics of cost and honesty moderate the relationship between these capital signals 
and investor alternatives, and (3) understand if the number of investor alternatives of a 
new venture mediates the relationship between the signals and the investment valuation 
received.  To address these questions, a thorough literature review was performed on 
signaling theory discussing the signaling environment to include senders, signals, 
receivers, and feedback.  Signal history in the context of evolutionary biology and 
anthropology was investigated in addition to the role of signals in the modern-day 
communications of firms.  Specifically, signals of new ventures were examined in the 
context of the business pitch.  A review of negotiation literature, specifically looking at 
power and BATNA, was completed to explain deal dynamics and how positions affect 
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negotiating results.  A theoretical model was proposed to answer the research questions 
and was operationalized for empirical evidence of conclusions.  In this chapter, the 
results are discussed along with their implications on theory and practice.  Limitations 
and future research directions are also included in this chapter. 
Results 
Prior research has shown that the business pitch plays a critical role in new 
ventures obtaining investment.  When the entrepreneur displays preparedness and 
cognitive legitimacy exists in the minds of investors, confidence in the future success of 
the firm is signaled leading to increased funding (Pollack et al., 2012).  Studies have 
indicated that entrepreneurs and new ventures communicate signals about their 
opportunities (e.g., Nagy et al., 2012), but what has not been explored is how these 
signals lead to increasing financing alternatives for the firm, and whether or not these 
alternatives result in a more favorable deal for the firm.  Further, the entrepreneurship 
community has not explored how the perceived cost and honesty of specific signal types 
affect the decision-making of investors.  To address these questions, this study draws 
from prior signaling theory and power-dependence theory research to formulate a model 
which explores how specific signals may lead to alternatives and a better deal for the 
entrepreneur.  Conceptually, the central hypothesis is that new ventures which 
communicate a greater quantity of high-quality signals in a business pitch should signal 
more attractiveness as an investment opportunity to investors thus more investors should 
be interested in investing in the opportunity.  Further, with more investor alternatives for 
the new venture, negotiating power should shift away from investors to entrepreneurs, 
leading to a better deal for the entrepreneurs. 
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Research Question 1 
The first research question was analyzed in four variations to see the effects of 
signals on alternatives for each signal type – human capital, social capital, intellectual 
capital, and financial capital.  The premise for all four is the same: The greater the 
number of signals of the capital type, the greater the number of investor alternatives for 
the new venture.  As positive signals communicate attractive characteristics, this study 
argued that sending more of these signals during the business pitch would increase 
investor interest.  The study was operationalized using Shark Tank business pitches for a 
consistent pitch format and for a standardized range of investor alternatives (zero to five 
potential investors in an opportunity). 
For each research question, the data was analyzed in two ways, first looking at all 
289 business pitches which include both funded and unfunded opportunities, and second, 
looking at just the funded opportunities (N = 140).  By looking at just the funded 
opportunities, the analysis removes any potential bias related to pitches not receiving 
funding as a majority of these have zero alternatives.  Poisson regression was used to 
analyze the data with the target variable being the quantity of alternatives.  Under both 
scenarios and for all four signal types, the findings empirically show that there is not 
support for the hypothesis that signals lead to more investor alternatives.  While one may 
look at these results and conclude that there is no relationship, there could be more to the 
story that was not captured from the analyzed pitch segments.  One thought is that other 
factors come into play such as the full story or sensegiving (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) 
of the business pitch which causes an investor to connect with the new venture beyond 
just the verbal signals.  These additional factors could weigh in the decision-making 
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either instead of or in combination with the verbal communication.  Another potential 
reason for the insignificant findings may be due to the study design.  Since only the initial 
business pitch was analyzed, meaning the portion of the pitch that was planned by the 
entrepreneur, investors decisions may come during the detailed question and answer 
dialogue which follows the entrepreneur's planned pitch.  These topics are discussed in 
further detail in the limitations and future research directions section of this chapter. 
Research Question 2 
The second research question explores signal strength characteristics of cost and 
honesty to see if they moderate the relationship between signals and alternatives.  As in 
Research Question 1, the data was analyzed in two ways, first looking at all business 
pitches which include both funded and unfunded opportunities, and second looking at just 
the funded opportunities.  The analysis of both populations was completed twice, once 
for the signal characteristic of cost followed by honesty.  Conceptually, the argument was 
that signals perceived to be stronger than others would have an effect on the investor 
interest.  Interaction terms were calculated and analyzed using Poisson regression 
analysis as in Research Question 1.  For both cost and honesty characteristics, and for 
both populations that were analyzed, the interaction factors were also found not to be 
significant.  As with Research Question 1, the results for Research Question 2 could be 
due to similar issues.  The empirical results suggest that the characteristic strengths do 
not change the outcomes.  By extending the content that is analyzed to include the 
question and answer period of the negotiations, the results could differ.  Again, this is 




Research Question 3 
The third research question seeks to understand if investor alternatives is a 
mediating factor between high-quality signals and deal terms.  Conceptually, as signals 
should drive investment interest, negotiation leverage should favor the entrepreneur and 
lead to a better deal.  Similar to the first two research questions, the data was analyzed in 
two ways, first looking at all business pitches which include both funded and unfunded 
opportunities, and second looking at just the funded opportunities. 
 When looking at the entire population of funded and unfunded deals, there is a 
significant relationship between alternatives and deal terms, but there is not support for 
the hypothesis as there is not a significant relationship between signals and deal structure. 
In addition, this significant relationship between alternatives and deal structure is likely 
due to the bias that is created when no alternatives exist.  Thus, to accurately analyze the 
effects of the mediation, emphasis should be placed on the analysis that looks only at 
funded opportunities as the bias is removed. 
 Looking at the results of the scenario that removes the unfunded pitches, there is 
not support for the hypothesis as there are no significant relationships between the 
independent, dependent, or proposed mediating variables.  Though results did not support 
the hypotheses, what this study has accomplished is establish a framework to explore 
other business pitch format variations.  For example, signals communicated throughout 
the entire business pitch which would include post-pitch questions and answers between 




External Validity of Theoretical Model 
In conjunction with the quantitative analysis, this study assessed the external 
validity of the core research question on whether or not entrepreneurs attempt to 
communicate positive messages of signal capital types during business pitches to 
improve financing success.  The goal of this supplemental qualitative analysis was to 
obtain direct insight from entrepreneurs to understand decisions of pitch content.  As part 
of this study’s respondent selection criteria, only entrepreneurs who have pitched their 
opportunities for investment were selected.  Molina-Azorín et al.'s article titled Mixed 
methods studies in entrepreneurship research: Applications and contributions (2012) 
highlights various mixed method approaches to research.  This process used what the 
authors consider the Group III approach in which quantitative analysis is the dominant 
method of the analysis while qualitative research is used to shed more light on the 
findings.  In order to acquire feedback from a broad spectrum of entrepreneurs, a five 
open-ended question survey was sent out to entrepreneurs with pitching experience.  
Through the Youngstown Business Incubator’s network of early stage ventures, 31 
entrepreneurs with history of giving one or more business pitches, were sent the survey to 
complete.  A total of 17 surveys were completed through Qualtrics representing a 
response rate of 55%.  The intent of the survey was to gain an understanding of what 
entrepreneurs feel is important to convey to potential investors.  Instead of asking about 
whether or not specific venture quality signal types as described in the entrepreneurship 
literature were communicated, this study took the approach of having no preconceived 
notions of what types of “capital” (human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, 
and/or financial capital) were communicated thus allowing the respondents to describe 
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their content in their own words.  In addition, the study intended to understand the effects 
of other investment alternatives available to the entrepreneur at the time of their pitch.  
As these entrepreneurs could be at various stages in their company’s development, all 
were asked to reflect on their initial pitch experience and their thoughts before and after 
this event.  The goal was to look for generalizability and patterns.  The five questions 
asked were as follows: 
Question 1: Please detail specifics related to your FIRST business pitch 
experience. Include 1] the investor type that you pitched (a general answer such 
as angel investor, venture capitalist, business owner in the same industry, etc. is 
fine), 2] the venue or environment that you gave the pitch, and 3] any specific 
time limit or format that you were given by the potential investor prior to your 
pitch (if any). 
Question 2: For this FIRST business pitch, did you have a formal presentation 
prepared such as a PowerPoint or pitch deck?  Please explain what you 
prepared.  In preparing for your pitch, what specific information did you feel was 
most important to communicate to the potential investor(s) and why?  Please 
detail. 
Question 3: When you pitched your opportunity, how much money were you 
seeking and how much equity were you offering for the funding?  At this time, did 
you have other funding (or investor) alternatives and did you convey this in your 
pitch to this potential investor?  Please detail. 
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Question 4: Do you feel you had prepared and presented exactly the information 
that the investor would want to know about your opportunity to evaluate it?  Why 
or why not?  What was the result of the pitch?  [If successful, were the terms 
different from what you were initially seeking?  In what ways?] 
Question 5: In hindsight, is there anything that you think that you should have 
communicated in your pitch that would have improved your results?  If so, what 
specific information did you add or delete in your presentation before your next 
pitch?  Please detail. 
The first survey question was used to gain an understanding of the venues in 
which the surveyed entrepreneurs first presented their businesses for investment.  The 
survey results showed that of the 17 respondents, there were two types of pitch types, (1) 
a business pitch as a part of a competition featuring prize money, or (2) a business pitch 
given directly to specific angel investors, venture capital firms, or business accelerators 
involving a transfer of equity for capital or resources.  Business pitches given as part of 
competitions had varying time lengths, however most formats resembled the Shark Tank 
design in that the entrepreneurs would first present their prepared pitched followed by a 
question and answer period between the entrepreneurs and potential investors.  These 
competitions occurred mainly at universities or at organizations established to assist 
entrepreneurs such as business accelerators and incubators.  The business pitches directly 
to specific investors did not have a standard format, time length, or common meeting 
place.  These meetings occurred in various venues including conference rooms, coffee 
shops, or even virtually via video chats. 
126 
 
 Survey Question 2 was used to gain a better understanding of the preparation that 
occurred prior to the pitch.  For the most part, entrepreneurs prepared PowerPoint 
presentations or pitch decks prior to the business pitch.  As for the specific content that 
was emphasized by the entrepreneurs, most wanted to accentuate the problem and 
solution as they felt this was the most important information investors would want to 
know about the opportunity.  The entrepreneurs did respond with numerous venture 
quality signals outlined in the theoretical portion of this study as information they wanted 
to communicate to investors.  For example, Respondent #1 said “We mostly focused on 
the problem and our solution, as well as our team” which describes a Human Capital 
signal.  This respondent continued to explain the reason for conveying this information 
was “to show that our team was able to execute our solution ourselves.”  Additional 
support for theory appearing in practice was from Respondent #5 when the entrepreneur 
stated that they wanted to show their “prototype and Excel spreadsheet projection of the 
costs and earnings” as they felt they were “most important to express the solution” which 
shows support for both the Intellectual Capital and Financial Capital signals.  The 
completed responses are shown in the Appendix. 
 Survey Question 3 was developed to get an understanding of the entrepreneur’s 
goals and investment alternatives at the time of the pitch.  There was a clear difference in 
responses as those pitching in a competition were focused on the prize.  These businesses 
appeared to be at an earlier stage of development while the businesses pitching specific to 
investment had more precise (and larger) investment requests in exchange for equity.  
From responses received, it appeared that other financing alternatives were mostly 
unavailable, and if available, were not used to enhance negotiation positions.  The lack of 
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other alternatives at this stage is not unexpected as the respondents were asked to reflect 
on their initial pitch experience.  However, the value of alternatives is something that at 
least one entrepreneur recognized as valuable as Respondent #3 eloquently stated “If I 
would have had previous funding I would have conveyed this because it gives my idea 
credibility seeing that others were willing to invest in me as well.”   
 Survey Question 4 was a reflection on how the entrepreneur felt that the 
information was presented as the potential investors would want to see it.  This question 
received mixed answers as a number of entrepreneurs felt like they did not present what 
the investors expected.  For example, Respondent #5 described it as “a valuable lesson in 
growth” and Respondent #8 stated “after this pitch and 20-30 other preparation pitches, 
the objective was to get feedback to improve the deck through many iterations.”  In other 
words, the entrepreneurs were realizing that the business pitch is an evolution.  There 
were several respondents that felt like their pitch experience was a success.  The common 
theme amongst those respondents was that their success was due either to the fact that 
those that the pitch audience was “very specific about what topics should be covered in 
the pitch” as described by Respondent #14 or that there was proper preparation as “we 
had worked with multiple advisors and mentors that really helped us craft an amazing 
pitch” as Respondent #9 revealed.  Interestingly, Respondent #12 highlighted a point that 
was discussed in Chapter 2 as a factor in negotiation success, the phenomenon of the 
fear-of-missing-out (FoMO).  This respondent stated that “the best pitches for money 
should have investors feeling FoMO, or a feeling of its too good to be true (leading them 
to ask more questions to dig for the missing red flag).”  Though this respondent explains 
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an important point that is highlighted in this study, unfortunately the entrepreneur 
revealed that they “did not instill FoMO” in their first pitch thus were unsuccessful. 
 Finally, Survey Question 5 asked what entrepreneurs could have added to their 
pitch to improve success.  The responses received to this question showed that 
entrepreneurs see the importance of signaling specific information to investors.  In 
addition, the responses of information they plan to communicate align with the venture 
quality signal types discussed in the theoretical portion of this study.  Example responses 
include “we should have focused more on the financial opportunity” (Respondent #1) 
describing Financial Capital signals and “we should have communicated our ability to 
program the MVP (minimum viable product) ourselves” (Respondent #7) describing 
Human Capital signals.  A number of respondents spoke about their need to communicate 
their go-to-market strategy and defensible positions which relate to the Intellectual 
Capital signals.  Other themes that came from the responses were that their business 
models needed improvement, that they needed to be clearer of their “needs,” and that 
they needed to improve their presentation skills.  Respondents #2 and #12 both thought it 
would be important to have more business experience by the time the initial pitch 
occurred and that validation is important within the pitch, highlighting an issue that many 
entrepreneurs face – the timing on when to seek financing.  Surprisingly, very few 
responses discussed Social Capital signals.  This is potentially due to the life cycle stage 
of the companies in that the affiliations with other companies or individuals have not 
been established or that it was too early to foresee such relationships.  The responses to 





New ventures are challenged with the task of educating and enticing potential 
investors within a short window of time to draw interest and investment.  This research 
study provides several implications for entrepreneurship and negotiation research and 
practice.  The following looks at how this study affects these areas. 
Entrepreneurship Research 
While the new venture body of research is rich, this study is the first to examine 
the role of power-dependence theory within entrepreneurship.  More specifically, this 
study adds to the entrepreneurship literature by providing a thorough review of research 
related to BATNA (see Table 2).  New ventures are at a disadvantage to established firms 
when attempting to obtain financial growth capital as they are typically limited to equity 
financing from private investors as debt financing is unobtainable from financiers.  
Equity financing requires that entrepreneurs and investors negotiate terms of the 
financing.  Having better knowledge of negotiation dynamics is useful for entrepreneurs 
and thus this is an area for entrepreneurship researchers to focus efforts.  Similarly, this 
study adds to the entrepreneurship literature by providing a thorough review of business 
pitch research (see Table 1). 
A significant contribution to entrepreneurship research that evolved from this 
study was the creation of fourteen CATA dictionaries that can be used for further content 
analyses related to entrepreneurial signals.  Since these dictionaries were created 
separately for each capital signal characteristic of human capital, social capital, 
intellectual capital, and financial capital, studies that intend to look at specific 
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components of these signals can utilize focused dictionaries.  These dictionaries were 
constructed by industry experts using the accepted methodology outlined in prior 
entrepreneurship research (Short et al., 2010).  There were six CATA dictionaries related 
to human capital signals: (1) Top management team legitimacy and reputation, (2) 
Entrepreneurial team make-up, (3) Gender and racial diversity, (4) Industry knowledge 
and experience, (5) Prior Founding Experience, and (6) Education.  There were three 
CATA dictionaries related to social capital signals: (1) New ventures with third-party 
alliances or affiliations, (2) Large board diversity, and (3) Existing high-profile investors 
or venture capitalists.  Two CATA dictionaries were created related to intellectual capital 
signals: (1) Patents and prototypes, and (2) Business plans.  Finally, there were three 
CATA dictionaries created related to financial capital signals: (1) Meaningful company 
financial projections, (2) Management's certification of financial statements, and (3) 
Positive industry growth rate projections. 
Finally, a thorough review of signals and signaling theory in the context of the 
entrepreneurial pitch was conducted as part of this study.  As part of this review, this 
study explored the origin of signals from the perspective of evolutionary biology and 
anthropology.  In addition, this review looked at the individual components of the 
signaling environment which includes the components of senders, signals, receivers, and 
feedback.  A systematic review of signals was completed to develop the list of potential 
signals that entrepreneurs can communicate to investors which went into the development 





In addition to the review of the BATNA research (Table 2), the most significant 
contribution to negotiation literature was the testing of theory with real world negotiation 
data, not experimental data.  As discussed, though there are potential issues with the data 
set selected for analysis, this study puts together a framework that can be applied to 
future studies in which negotiation interactions in their entirety can be analyzed using 
content analysis to evaluate alternatives and negotiation success. 
Entrepreneurs and Investors 
 Entrepreneurs that understand the attributes that strengthen leverage in an equity 
financing negotiation may potentially be able to attract the desired amount of growth 
capital while minimizing the amount of equity needed to complete the transaction when 
addressing the challenges of financing.  Though this study did not conclude that specific 
signals will improve the number of investor alternatives, this study does provide 
entrepreneurs with an outline of the types of signals to convey to investors.  As suggested 
in this paper, further analysis should be completed using other data sources and as such, 
entrepreneurs may want to stay tuned for potential revelations as a result of these studies.  
With additional research on this topic, entrepreneurs may be able to understand the 
signals that trigger investor interest.  This knowledge could lead to better pitch design or 
pitch modifications to shift negotiation power and improve results. 
 Angel investors and venture capitalists can use this research in developing an 
outline for evaluating opportunity strengths.  These investors can use the fourteen venture 
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quality signals as a scorecard to evaluate attributes that are communicated during 
investment pitches and use the results for basis of investment. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
There are several limitations of the study related to the data source and 
measurements that must be acknowledged when interpreting the results of the study. 
First, there are limitations that exist by using the televised episodes of Shark Tank 
as the data source.  Though there are several positive characteristics which provide a 
negotiation context that is favorable for analysis, there are multiple limitations that may 
be the driving force behind the results. 
One positive characteristic of Shark Tank is that the content from the show is not 
scripted.  This has been confirmed through prior research using the data set (Pollack et 
al., 2012).  Another positive is that the Shark Tank investors risk their own money 
making their choice on whether or not to invest authentic.  The negotiations are not 
experimental and the investment decisions have real implications.  Another positive at the 
time of study design was that the data allowed for a standardized comparison as the 
pitches were all limited to the initial presentation from the entrepreneur.  By analyzing 
only this segment, the content was constrained to the entrepreneur’s intended 
presentation.  The fact that the Shark Tank pitches always had five potential investors 
also provided consistency. 
As for potential negatives of the data set, there are several.  First, since the 
potential investor pool is always limited to five specific investors on Shark Tank, there is 
a possibility that one or more of the investors have relationships with other companies 
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with similar products or services.  This can be a positive or negative for the company 
presenting a pitch which can factor into the alternative count from a specific pitch.  It is 
possible that an investor would identify synergies with one of their portfolio companies 
causing them to view the opportunity through a different lens than other investors.  For 
example, there may be cross-selling or economies of scale opportunities by connecting 
the two organizations, both of which would be positive reasons for investment.  On the 
other hand, an investor may have a relationship with another company which could 
prevent further investment within a specific industry due to potential conflicts of interest 
thus removing them from the pool of investors.  Similarly, investors have specific 
backgrounds and interests that may encourage or discourage investment in a specific 
industry.  For example, one investor on Shark Tank, Robert Herjavec, has experience in 
the software security industry, while another investor, Damon John, has a background in 
fashion industry, which are unrelated.  Though an investor’s background does not 
exclude investment in an industry, their expertise and knowledge about opportunities 
outside their areas of familiarity may cause a difference in how an opportunity is viewed 
and acted upon.  While this is definitely a limitation due to the small number of investor 
alternatives available during a Shark Tank pitch, these differences resemble the 
advantages and disadvantages an entrepreneur may experience when pitching to angel 
investors outside of Shark Tank.  At the new venture stage, resources are often scarce and 
thus entrepreneurs handle most facets of the business operations meaning they cannot 
devote full-time to fundraising activities. This lack of time to devote to fundraising likely 
leads to lower quantities of potential angel investor discussions.  Less discussions with 
investors likely mean a higher variance in the backgrounds and thus the Shark Tank 
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experience is reasonably reflective of what entrepreneurs will face outside of Shark Tank 
at this life cycle stage.  Since backgrounds and relationships could factor into decision-
making, future research could examine investor traits such as knowledge, experience, and 
business affiliations to see how these attributes affect their investment decisions. 
Another potential limitation relates to investor willingness to fund a company 
within a specific industry, not on the basis of the pitch signals communicated.  Though 
industry growth is a component of the financial capital signal composite variable, 
industry growth could be the driving factor for investment.  There is a saying that “a 
rising tide lifts all boats” meaning that even with a subpar business pitch, an entrepreneur 
may receive investment interest due to its industry affiliation, not necessary based on the 
strengths related to other communicated qualities.  Future research could examine higher 
quantities of business opportunities within specific industry sectors to remove this 
potential bias. 
One additional limitation is that this analysis assumes that a high-quality pitch 
would likely result in investor interest.  While this typically is true, there are occasions in 
which investors may be interested in the business opportunity but only if separated from 
the entrepreneur.  In situations like this, the investor may offer to buy out the company in 
its entirety to remove the entrepreneur from the operations.  Where the investment pitch 
may have been poor warranting zero alternatives, one or more alternatives may be 
presented to purchase the company in its entirety.  This could alter the results of the deal 
as the terms are different than the initial asking terms presented by the entrepreneur.  On 
the other hand, investors may decline offering a funding alternative as they feel the 
entrepreneur does not need their assistance.  In these instances, the investor may 
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encourage the entrepreneur to stay their existing course as a way to maintain control and 
preserve equity as the investor sees that the entrepreneur as being capable of success 
without outside assistance.  This study does not separate these instances as reasons for or 
against investment are not always disclosed.  Future research could involve an active 
involvement with the investors during the decision-making process so that their choices 
can be documented explaining rational for their actions. 
Another limitation in the study is that investors assume that information presented 
is factual.  During due diligence, there is a possibility that the funding may not come to 
fruition or that the deal terms are renegotiated.  This is no different than what happens in 
other funding or merger and acquisition transactions outside of Shark Tank.  Information 
is initially presented about the opportunity and once a letter of intent is presented and 
deal terms agreed upon, a due diligence period begins in which advisors perform an 
analysis to confirm that the presented information is accurate.  If found to be inaccurate, 
potential buyers may terminate the deal or renegotiate reflecting the uncovered 
information.  Since this study analyzes the alternatives based on presented information 
during the business pitch, whether or not the deals actually were funded or the terms of 
the deal renegotiated is irrelevant.  Though irrelevant in this study, future research could 
look at the success and failure of firms at various time checkpoints after the pitch and 
investment to see if specific signals sent lead to higher success or failure rates. 
A limitation also exists based on the unit of measure of deal valuation ratio.  
Entrepreneurs enter Shark Tank requesting a specific amount of funding in exchange for 
a specific amount of equity.  This amount translates into a valuation that the entrepreneur 
places on the business.  If a deal is consummated, an agreed upon amount of funding is 
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provided to the business in exchange for a percentage of equity which represents a 
valuation for the investment.  This difference between these two valuations represents the 
deal ratio which reflects the deal term success for the entrepreneur.  If the entrepreneur 
receives what is asked for, the ratio would be 1.0.  In comparison, if the entrepreneur 
receives half of the desired amount or must give up twice the amount of equity for the 
requested amount, the ratio would be 0.50.  While this ratio serves as a decent proxy to 
display the success of the negotiated deal terms related to alternatives, it has a limitation 
since it anchors off an initial asking valuation that is established by the entrepreneur.  
This asking amount is often developed by an entrepreneur without much support as many 
of the opportunities are pre-revenue or pre-earnings.  An entrepreneur that has an asking 
valuation that is realistic and aligns with the valuation of investors is more likely to have 
a ratio closer to one another.  Valuations that are further apart could either reflect the 
differences in alternatives (less alternatives means more negotiating leverage for the 
investor which is the basis of this study) or may reflect that the entrepreneur started at an 
unrealistic asking price.  Disconnects in asking prices could be the result of an 
entrepreneur (1) having unrealistic valuation expectations, (2) lacking business valuation 
knowledge, or (3) building a buffer for negotiations.  Future research could look at the 
education and experience signals of the entrepreneurs to evaluate how well they correlate 
with their initial valuation expectations.  
Finally, and potentially the most significant limitation of the study, relates to the 
content that was coded for the analysis.  As mentioned previously, for consistency 
parameter purposes, business pitch content prior to the question and answer period in 
which investors decide whether or not to invest was analyzed.  While this has its positives 
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in that the signals presented are those selected by the entrepreneur, there is useful 
information about the opportunity that gets disclosed after the pitch which may alter 
investor decision-making.  The average pitch time for the cases transcribed in this study 
was 4.5 minutes.  The average televised Shark Tank pitch which includes the additional 
questions, answers, and negotiations, lasts 10 minutes (Smith & Viceisza, 2018).  The 10 
minutes of airing is the result of an edited pitch for television.  The average unedited 
Shark Tank pitch lasts an hour, ranging from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours (Smith & Viceisza, 
2018).  While the show editors explain that all important details remain in the edited 
version, there is an extreme amount of time between the initial pitch and the time that 
investors decide whether or not to invest for positive or negative signals to be presented 
by the entrepreneur which could affect investor decision-making.  While any of the listed 
limitations could be the root cause of insignificant results, it is my belief that this is the 
most contributing factor.  Future research could involve the analysis of the full unedited 
entrepreneurial pitches.  Though it may be difficult to obtain full unedited transcripts 
from the producers of Shark Tank, local business pitch competitions could be recorded 
and analyzed using a similar format but the process enhanced with investors completing 
surveys in regards to their opinions of the entrepreneur, their pitch, and the overall 
opportunity. 
The Constraint on Generality (Simon, Shoda, & Lindsay, 2017) in this study is 
limited to prepared business pitches that do not involved additional fact finding questions 
by investors.  In addition, this constraint is limited to similar type investment scenarios in 
which sizable equity is exchanged for capital.  There is no reason to believe that 
evaluating a similar data set from Shark Tank, Dragon’s Den, or another similarly 
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constrained pitch would yield different results if the study is replicated.  However, as 
noted in the previous paragraph, we cannot conclude that venture quality signals do not 
affect alternatives as analyzing an entire pitch (which includes investor questions and 
answers) may yield different results as investors may decide whether or not to participate 
in a negotiation based on the entire opportunity presentation, not just the initial pitch. 
In conclusion, this study has established a framework for studying venture quality 
signals and how they may lead to investor alternatives.  Though the results of the 
empirical portion of the study did not reveal a significant relationship between signals 
and investor alternatives, the qualitative responses obtained by entrepreneurs and the 
limitations that came to light when analyzing the data, creates more questions than 
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